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INTRODUCTION
Daniela was born with ambiguous genitalia.1 Not able to tell
whether she was a boy or a girl, the doctors diagnosed her with con-
genital adrenal hyperplasia and an enlarged clitoris and “cut [her]
between [her] legs looking for a vagina.” 2 Then, when she was two
months old, doctors “opened [her] abdomen and found healthy testes,
which they threw in the garbage bin.”3 Later, after tests showed that
Daniela was chromosomally male, her “castration” was declared a
mistake and the doctors explained that they had to “continue this
way and the small patient [had to] be made a girl.” 4 As a result of
these procedures, Daniela spent much of her childhood in medical
facilities “suffering countless examinations of [her] genitals and
urethral opening.”5 According to her medical records, Daniela’s par-
ents never provided informed consent for the procedures.6
Despite decades of intersex activism,7 physicians in the United
States routinely perform medically unnecessary genital “normaliz-
ing” surgeries on children like Daniela born with intersex traits,8
often without the full informed consent of the children’s parents,
and certainly without the consent of the children. These cosmetic
surgical interventions—often made in infancy to alleviate the soci-
etal discomfort associated with deviations from the male-female
1. Daniela Truffer, It’s a Human Rights Issue!, in NORMALIZING INTERSEX: PERSONAL
STORIES 26, 26 (2015).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. The now-defunct Intersex Society of North America (ISNA), one of the f irst in-
tersex organizations, was founded in 1993 and advocated “for patients and families who
felt they had been harmed by their experiences with the health care system,” particularly
by “unwanted genital surgeries for people born with an anatomy that someone decided is
not standard for male or female.” Dear ISNA Friends and Supporters, INTERSEX SOC’Y
OF N. AM., http://www.isna.org [http://perma.cc/U7U3-8LMU]. Other intersex activist
organizations working to stop such surgeries include ISNA’s direct successor, Accord
Alliance, interACT (formerly Advocates for Informed Choice), AIS-DSD Support Group,
and the Organization Intersex International. See ACCORD ALL., http://www.accordalli
ance.org [http://perma.cc/J5C2-HQW3]; INTERACT, http://interactadvocates.org [http://
perma.cc/WFF3-G3RJ]; AIS-DSD SUPPORT GRP., http://aisdsd.org [http://perma.cc/BFP3
-D8QM]; ORG. INTERSEX INT’L, https://oiiinternational.com [http://perma.cc/7KVY-8T7G].
See also Robert Hupf, Allyship to the Intersex Community on Cosmetic, Non-Consensual
Genital “Normalizing” Surgery, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 73, 79–80 (2015).
8. Generally, members of the community do not employ the term “intersex” as a self-
identity gender category. Instead, “intersex” is used to describe sex traits possessed by
individuals within the community. For consistency, this Article will employ the term in
this manner, recognizing and validating the fact that there are people who do indeed
label themselves as “intersex.” Hupf, supra note 7, at 75–76.
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gender binary—result in a host of long-term medical, social, and
psychological repercussions for the children.9 These repercussions
include psychological trauma, loss of sexual response and pleasure,
infections, urinary incontinence, sterility, and surgically altered geni-
talia incongruent with gender identity.10
This Article recognizes that intersex activists in the United
States (and abroad, for that matter) have been clear in their desire
for a moratorium on medically unnecessary, non-consensual genital
“normalizing” surgeries.11 It thus hopes to contribute to the aca-
demic legal literature on executing that goal, particularly as it relates
to the untangling of the competing rights of parents versus those of
their children in this context. More specifically, this Article aims to
analyze these legal issues from the perspective of international hu-
man rights law, a frame that has been underexplored in U.S. intersex
legal scholarship and activism despite its potential to, inter alia,
clarify and fill gaps in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, particu-
larly relating to the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
Part I of this Article will offer an introduction to the biology of
intersex traits, as well as an overview of the current common medi-
cal protocol and its repercussions. It will first give an overview of
the umbrella term “intersex” and the various congenital conditions
it is used to denote. These conditions, which result in being born
with certain sex characteristics that do not fit within the standard
male-female binary, include congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH),
androgen insensitivity syndrome (AIS), gonadal dysgenesis, hypo-
spadias, Turner syndrome, and Klinefelter syndrome. Next, it will
present and problematize the common practice for treating infants
born with different types of intersex traits: medically unnecessary,
non-consensual genital “normalizing” surgical intervention. In par-
ticular, it will explain the repercussions of these interventions, includ-
ing psychological trauma, gender dysphoria, and chronic health
problems like loss of sexual response and pleasure, genital pain or
discomfort, and infections.
Part II will survey and analyze proposed solutions in U.S. legal
scholarship to the problems posed by medically unnecessary, non-
consensual “normalizing” surgeries. Specifically, it will highlight the
tensions between children’s rights and parents’ rights under U.S.
9. See Fact Sheet: Intersex, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R,
http://ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Discrimination/LGBT/FactSheets/UNFE_FactSheet
_Inter sex_EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/BSN6-TGJ7].
10. See Julie A. Greenberg, Health Care Issues Affecting People with an Intersex
Condition or DSD: Sex or Disability Discrimination?, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 849, 860 (2012);
Fact Sheet: Intersex, supra note 9.
11. Hupf, supra note 7, at 74.
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law and evaluate scholars’ proposed statutory and judicial interven-
tions. By highlighting the murkiness of U.S. law in this context, this
part will underscore the need to look at international human rights
law as an additional legal guidepost.
Part III will analyze the surgeries and the rights of parents and
children from the perspective of international human rights law.
Drawing from binding and persuasive international legal sources,
it will first identify the human rights issues and the relevant legal
obligations that are at stake for intersex children when it comes to
medically unnecessary, non-consensual “normalizing” surgeries, in-
cluding the right to liberty and security of person, the right to respect
for private life, and the prohibition of torture and inhuman or de-
grading treatment. Here, it will also explicate the benefits of the
human rights frame as compared to U.S. constitutional protections,
including the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Next, drawing from international sources again, it will
reveal what international law says regarding parents’ rights and how
that applies to the intersex context. Lastly, it will begin to clarify the
tension between the rights of intersex children and the rights of
their parents by looking at three parallel human rights issues where
children’s rights and parents’ rights are in conflict, namely female gen-
ital mutilation, child marriage, and corporal punishment of children.
After having outlined international human rights law’s capabili-
ties in the intersex context, Part IV will critically examine the concrete
impact that the legal regime has had, both doctrinally and institu-
tionally, for the rights of intersex people around the world. It will first
discuss how, in Colombia, international human rights and state obli-
gations have played a role in vindicating the rights of intersex children
in national courts. Next, it will describe how, in Chile, activists were
able to leverage international legal institutions, particularly treaty
bodies and their mechanisms, to push for government action in this
context. Lastly, it will consider how, in Malta, activists employed the
language of human rights and international human rights advocacy
networks to bring about a legislative moratorium on medically un-
necessary, non-consensual “normalizing” surgeries.12 Through these
analyses, the section will shed light on how the legal regime and its
institutions can be harnessed strategically to effect change in the
United States.
12. For clarity, I will hereinafter refer to “medically unnecessary, non-consensual
genital ‘normalizing’ surgeries” as simply “normalizing surgeries” or “intersex surgeries,”
except for the term’s f irst mention in a section. However, the reader should note that
references to “normalizing surgeries” and “intersex surgeries” in this Article always refer
to those surgeries on people born with intersex traits that are medically unnecessary and
non-consensual.
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Part V will conclude this Article by explicitly highlighting the
unique ways that human rights law can effect change for children
born with intersex traits in the United States. First, it will discuss
how the unique legal claims permitted by international human rights
law should be employed. Second, it will discuss the potential of treaty
body mechanisms, including the Human Rights Committee and the
Committee Against Torture, to effect change for intersex children in
the United States. Lastly, it will explain how developing and strength-
ening transnational intersex human rights networks could help
create a paradigm shift for intersex children in the United States.
I. INTERSEX 101: BIOLOGY AND COMMON MEDICAL PROTOCOL
A. Biology
The umbrella term “intersex” is employed to denote various con-
genital conditions in which a person is born with certain sex char-
acteristics—like genitals, gonads, or chromosome patterns—that do
not fit within the standard male-female binary.13 Having existed for
millennia,14 these traits are estimated to affect between 0.05% and
1.7% of the world population, the upper estimate being akin to the
number of red-haired people in the world.15 Caused by different
chromosomal and hormonal irregularities, the most common intersex
conditions include congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH), androgen
insensitivity syndrome (AIS), gonadal dysgenesis, hypospadias,
Turner syndrome, and Klinefelter syndrome.16 Respectively, these
conditions may result in, inter alia, the virilization of genitalia of
children with XX (typically female) chromosomes, the non-virilization
of genitalia of children with XY (typically male) chromosomes,
atypical gonad (testes or ovary) development, a urethral opening
that is not at the tip of the penis, gonadal dysgenesis, and small or
not particularly active testes in males born with XXY chromosomes
that sometimes causes infertility.17 “In the United States, it is
13. See Alice Domurat Dreger, A History of Intersexuality: From the Age of Gonads
to the Age of Consent, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 345, 345 (1998); Fact Sheet: Intersex, supra
note 9.
14. Christine Muckle, Comment, Giving a Voice to Intersex Individuals Through Hos-
pital Ethics Committees, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 987, 995 (2006).
15. Fact Sheet: Intersex, supra note 9.
16. Muckle, supra note 14, at 993–94.
17. Id. For a more comprehensive overview of the different types of intersex traits
and their causes, see also Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality
and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 278–92 (1999); Laura
Hermer, Paradigms Revised: Intersex Children, Bioethics & the Law, 11 ANNALS HEALTH
L. 195, 204–08 (2002).
464 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW           [  V    o l. 24:459
thought that approximately 1500 to 2000 children are born with
ambiguous external genitalia annually. . . .”18 While many intersex
traits are discovered at birth, some traits do not become apparent
until later in life, including during puberty.19
B. Common Medical Protocol
Since the 1950s, the common practice for treating infants born
with intersex traits has been medically unnecessary, non-consen-
sual genital “normalizing” surgical intervention.20 In the case of
female (XX) infants who are born with CAH and an “enlarged”
clitoris as a result of atypical adrenal function in utero, doctors may
perform a cosmetic clitoral reduction, which involves reducing the
size of an “unacceptable” clitoris.21 This medical intervention, which
will often destroy the ability to enjoy sexual intercourse, is based on
the unproven assumption that a clitoral reduction will improve a
girl’s “psychological well-being.” 22 Moreover, there is scant data on
18. Erin Lloyd, From the Hospital to the Courtroom: A Statutory Proposal for Recog-
nizing and Protecting the Legal Rights of Intersex Children, 12 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER
155, 157 (2005).
19. Id. at 158. One example of an intersex trait that reveals itself later is 5-alpha
reductase. See Peggy T. Cohen-Kettenis, Gender Change in 46,XY Persons with 5á-
Reductase-2 Deficiency and 17â-Hydroxysteroid Dehydrogenase-3 Deficiency, 34 ARCHIVES
SEXUAL BEHAV. 399, 399 (2005) (“Individuals with 5á-reductase-2 deficiency (5á-RD-2) and
17â-hydroxysteroid dehydrogenase-3 deficiency (17â-HSD-3) are often raised as girls.
Over the past number of years, this policy has been challenged because many individuals
with these conditions develop a male gender identity and make a gender role change
after puberty.”).
20. During the 1950s, two developments changed the manner in which medicine ap-
proached intersex traits. First, surgical technology advanced to the point where genitalia
could be modified to be “cosmetically acceptable.” Second, the idea that gender identity
was based upon nurture and not nature became scientif ically accepted, a theory later
advanced and popularized by psychologist John Money and his infamous “John-Joan”
case study. Looking to prove that gender identity was primarily learned, Money advised
the parents of an infant boy whose penis was accidentally destroyed during a botched
circumcision to reassign him as a girl and raise him as a female. Despite the child later
rejecting the female gender and transitioning to live as David Reimer when he was a
teenager, Money misrepresented his findings and widely reported that the sex reassign-
ment surgery was a success. David committed suicide at age thirty-eight after suffering
from years of depression. See Greenberg, supra note 10, at 856–57; Anne Puluka, Parent
Versus State: Protecting Intersex Children from Cosmetic Genital Surgery, 2015 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 2095, 2101–03 (2015); David Reimer, 38, Subject of the John/Joan Case, N.Y.
TIMES (May 12, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/12/us/david-reimer-38-subject-of
-the-john-joan-case.html?_r=0 [https//perma.cc/AQ3K-F3CG].
21. Greenberg, supra note 17, at 272; Lloyd, supra note 18, at 161. See also Sarah
Creighton et al., Timing and nature of reconstructive surgery for disorders of sex
development—Introduction, 8 J. PEDIATRIC UROLOGY 602, 603 (2012) (“Clitoroplasty is
essentially a cosmetic procedure. The aim of surgery is to reduce the size of the clitoris
whilst maintaining a feminine appearance.”).
22. Greenberg, supra note 10, at 889. See also Creighton et al., supra note 21, at 603.
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what this clitoral surgery should consist of, including on what the
appropriate size and site for incisions is.23 In addition, girls who are
born with complete androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS) may be
born without a vagina or with a shortened vaginal canal, an intersex
trait that may prompt a doctor to surgically create a vagina or to
expand the shortened vagina.24 As women with CAIS will never
menstruate or bear children due to the absence of a uterus, the only
reason for such an early intervention is to give the infant the possi-
bility of future heterosexual intercourse,25 assuming that the infant
will indeed desire heterosexual intercourse.26 Doctors will also per-
form surgery to “correct” hypospadias, an intersex trait where the
urethra is found somewhere other than the tip of the penis, to make
genitalia look more typical, allow for urinating in a standing posi-
tion, and achieve a straight erection.27 Again, despite the fact that in
most cases the procedure is often cosmetic28 and there is no immedi-
ate medical reason to move the urethral opening, doctors will per-
form the surgery to prevent hypothetical future “emotional trauma”
resulting from atypical genitalia.29
23. Creighton et al., supra note 21, at 603 (“There is much debate but little data on
all aspects of clitoral surgery including the appropriate size and site for incisions on skin
and crura, whether or not to anchor the clitoris to the bony pelvis, how much corporal
tissue to remove as well as the requirement for reduction of the glans clitoris and what
techniques best achieve this.” ).
24. Greenberg, supra note 17, at 286; Greenberg, supra note 10, at 893; Hermer,
supra note 17, at 206.
25. Creighton et al., supra note 21, at 604–05 (“Since the vagina has no function in
early childhood, vaginoplasty could be postponed until after puberty. . . . Even in cases
where the UGS is long and vaginal entry high, vaginal surgery may be delayed until
adolescence as, in most cases, menstruation can occur through the common urogenital
sinus. In theory, obstruction to menstruation may occur, although there are no reports
in the literature of this.” ).
26. See Greenberg, supra note 10, at 893–94. See also Creighton et al., supra note 21,
at 604 (“There is a perception that girls with virilized genitalia left intact may suffer
unwarranted social interactions with their peers (e.g., the locker room time at school),
leading to embarrassment and social withdrawal. Furthermore, the idea of ‘doing
nothing’ sometimes represents a stressful concept for some parents who have diff iculties
coping with the appearance of their child’s genitalia, especially if not adequately followed
by a supportive multidisciplinary team.”).
27. Creighton et al., supra note 21, at 607; Greenberg, supra note 10, at 894; Lloyd,
supra note 18, at 161.
28. Creighton et al., supra note 21, at 607 (“[T]he cosmetic aspect of the operation
should not be underestimated, since over 70% of adults followed after hypospadias repair
reported that appearance was as important as having a functionally appropriate
phallus.”).
29. See Creighton et al., supra note 21, at 607–08; Greenberg, supra note 10, at 895.
There are studies reporting a higher complication rate in hypospadias procedures after
one year of age, but the conclusiveness of these studies are debated. For example, many
of the patients studied were undergoing a hypospadias procedure to f ix a hypospadias
surgery that was done in the patient’s infancy. Creighton et al., supra note 21, at 607–08.
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To be sure, of the many medical conditions that can cause
intersex traits, a small minority results in anatomical variations
that could, “on rare occasion, require[ ] surgery out of medical neces-
sity.” 30 These medical conditions, however, are not the subject of
this Article. These necessary surgeries include the necessary “re-
moval of obstruction of the urinary tract”; the “repair of bladder
exstrophy (when a child is born with internal organs exposed)”; and
the surgical prevention of infertility in boys with undescended
testes.31 In addition, some intersex traits may increase a child’s
chances of suffering from gonadal cancer.32 “[I]f cancer is present,
treatment is medically necessary.” 33 If cancer risk is low, however,
surgical intervention can “safely be delayed until after puberty.” 34
It should also be noted that certain medical treatments have
fallen out of recommended practice. However, they may still occur
around the country (and around the world), especially where doctors
are not abreast of new standards of care. For example, male (XY)
infants born with “inadequate” penises—i.e., penises that will be
incapable of penetrating a vagina or that will not allow a boy to
urinate while standing—were often surgically altered, given hor-
mones, and raised as girls.35 When a male was diagnosed with a
“micropenis,” doctors would reassign the child’s sex to female36 by
“surgically recessing and reducing the phallus to become a ‘clitoris,’
building a vagina from the colon or other tissue, and using the
testicular tissue to create the labia.” 37 Though it is much less com-
mon now for a child with micropenis to be assigned female since
30. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “I WANT TO BE LIKE NATURE MADE ME”: MEDICALLY UN-
NECESSARY SURGERIES ON INTERSEX CHILDREN IN THE US 23 (2017), https://www.hrw.org
/sites/default/files/report_pdf/lgbtintersex0717_web_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7F8-RWCE].
31. Id. at 24.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Greenberg, supra note 10, at 857. Puluka, supra note 20, at 2100 n. 34 (saying
“[t]he average clitoris length at birth is approximately 0.85 centimeters or shorter, [while]
the average penis length at birth is between approximately 2.5 and 4.5 centimeters. . .
[a]nything that falls between 0.85 centimeters and 2.5 centimeters is medically unac-
ceptable, calling for corrective surgery.”) (citing a “Phall-O-Metrics” diagram in ANNE
FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
SEXUALITY 59 (2000)).
36. Lloyd, supra note 18, at 160. The medical literature will talk about “male” and
“female” children in terms of chromosomes and some doctors insist that surgery is only
a sex assignment if they are assigning a sex that is discordant with chromosomes. How-
ever, it should be noted that many advocates disagree with those characterizations. They
argue that intersex children by definition have mixed markers of sex and chromosomes
are not the def initive marker, and that genital “normalizing” surgeries on infants are
always an attempt to assign sex, one that often fails.
37. Id.
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phallus length is no longer the only driver of a gender assignment
decision, this decision may ultimately be dependent on the viability
of the child’s testes. In the case of AIS (complete or partial), where
an infant’s genitalia were not virilized or only partially virilized,
doctors would typically remove the testes to prevent cancer and
perform a cosmetic vaginoplasty to “create a vagina capable of ‘receiv-
ing’ a penis.” 38 Though some of the male infants with PAIS would
have functional testicles and thus the ability to reproduce, doctors
would eliminate their reproductive capacity under the assumption
that living with an “inadequate” penis is too traumatic.39 Often, how-
ever, this procedure is still pushed on teenagers.
C. The Repercussions of the Common Medical Protocol
Despite doctors’ concerns for children’s future psychological
well-beings, adults born with intersex traits who have undergone
genital “normalizing” surgeries consistently report that these medi-
cal interventions do more harm than good. First, they highlight that
the concealment-based medical protocol—whereby doctors, at worst,
conceal from parents and children the nature of intersex traits or,
at best, mislead parents and children about safety and necessity of
“normalizing” surgery—inadvertently leads to psychological trauma
as it perpetuates shame “by reinforcing cultural norms of sexual
abnormality.” 40 Second, this model—which in truth may not be as
widespread today in the United States given recent Consensus State-
ments (though concrete data on this is lacking)41—also leads to
doctors telling parents half-truths about their children’s traits in an
effort to shield them from the uncomfortable realities of having a
child born with intersex traits, an issue that calls into question
whether these surgeries are performed with informed consent.42
Third, for children who are surgically assigned a sex, intersex ac-
tivists highlight that “interventions could lead to irreversible [and
harrowing] harm if the child’s gender identity [does] not develop in
conformity with the surgically altered genitalia.” 43 Fourth, adults
38. Id. at 160–61.
39. Greenberg, supra note 10, at 857–58.
40. Id. at 859–60.
41. Infra notes 51–54.
42. Alice Domurat Dreger, “Ambiguous Sex”—or Ambivalent Medicine?: Ethical Issues
in the Treatment of Intersexuality, 28 HASTINGS CTR. REP., 24, 27–28 (1998). A doctor’s
own biases may also inform the manner in which she discusses the available options to
the parent of an intersex child. For example, she may caution, without scientific evidence,
that not operating can lead to “problems” of gender identity or sexual orientation. See
Lloyd, supra note 18, at 171.
43. Greenberg, supra note 10, at 860.
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who underwent a procedure also explain that these surgical inter-
ventions create a plethora of chronic health problems, including a
loss of sexual response and pleasure, “genital pain or discomfort,
infections, scarring, urinary incontinence, and [ironically,] cosmetic-
ally unacceptable genitalia.” 44 For example, boys who undergo
surgery for hypospadias may require multiple invasive surgeries,
which can result in difficulty urinating, scarring, and poor cosmetic
results.45 Lastly, people who were subjected to such surgeries say
that the surgery amounts to “a sexual violation leading to a pro-
found loss of their autonomy [and personal privacy] and extreme
humiliation.” 46 Activists and even many doctors argue that the
negative consequences that arise from these cosmetic surgical inter-
ventions, in conjunction with the fact that there is often no evidence
that the surgeries are done for an objectively clear medical reason,
suggest that “normalizing” surgeries are medically unnecessary.47
D. Limited Progress
Though surgical intervention for treating infants born with
intersex traits continues to be the common medical protocol, the
efforts of intersex activists have not been in vain. In 2006, their push
to raise awareness finally led to the United States–based Lawson
Wilkins Pediatric Endocrine Society48 and the European Society for
Paediatric Endocrinology49 creating “a task force of physicians to
analyze the issue and develop a new treatment method.” 50 This task
force produced a Consensus Statement51 encouraging a shift to a
more patient-centered model and emphasizing that “open communi-
cation with patients and families is essential, and participation in
decision-making is encouraged. . . .” 52 The Consensus Statement
also noted that systematic evidence supporting the idea that the
surgeries must be performed in the first year of life was ultimately
44. Id.
45. Id. at 895.
46. Id. 859–60.
47. Recent medical Consensus Statements themselves recognize that it is not neces-
sary to do most of these surgeries in infancy, in that they recognize postponement as an
option. See, e.g., infra note 54.
48. See About Us, PEDIATRIC ENDOCRINE SOC’Y, https://www.pedsendo.org/about/in
dex.cfm [http://perma.cc/T8RU-6KGN].
49. See About, EUR. SOC’Y FOR PAEDIATRIC ENDOCRINOLOGY, https://www.eurospe.org
/about [http://perma.cc/K584-W535].
50. Puluka, supra note 20, at 2105.
51. Peter A. Lee et al., Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders,
118 PEDIATRICS e488, e488 (2006).
52. Id. at e490.
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lacking, opening the door to the idea that the surgeries should be
postponed until the child is able to consent.53 There was also a 2016
update to the Consensus Statement, which further urges respect for
the autonomy:
With some variations, guidance from clinicians and ethicists has
focused on principles and processes aimed at fostering the over-
all well-being of the child and future adult by: (1) minimizing
physical and psychosocial risk; (2) preserving potential for fertil-
ity; (3) upholding the individual’s rights to participate in deci-
sions that will affect their now or later; (4) leaving options open
for the future by avoiding irreversible treatments that are not
medically necessary until the individual has the capacity to con-
sent; (5) providing psychosocial support and PS; (6) supporting
the individual’s healthy sexual and gender identity development;
(7) using a shared decision-making approach that respects the
individual’s and parents’ wishes and beliefs; (8) respecting the
family and parent-child relationships, and (9) providing patients
with full medical information appropriate for age, developmental
stage and cognitive abilities. While each of these principles is
important, striking the appropriate balance among them becomes
challenging in the clinical setting. For example, respecting par-
ents’ wishes for early genital surgery may impinge on the child’s
right to participate in decision making and may reduce the child’s
options for the future.54
More recently, the North American Society for Pediatric and Ado-
lescent Gynecology released a statement that represents a signifi-
cant step toward ending medically unnecessary surgery on intersex
children who are too young to consent.55 Urging respect for the
autonomy of intersex children and for their active participation in
decisions about surgical procedures, the statement held:
We believe that surgery alone does not address all the implica-
tions associated with DSD conditions.56 Some DSD conditions
require early surgical intervention to optimize health and fertility.
53. See id. at e491.
54. Peter A. Lee et al., Global Disorders of Sex Development Update since 2006:
Perceptions, Approach and Care, 85 HORMONE RES. PÆDIATRICS 158, 176 (2016) (internal
citation omitted).
55. NASPAG POSITION STATEMENT ON SURGICAL MANAGEMENT OF DSD, N. AM. SOC’Y
FOR PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT GYNECOLOGY (2017), http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.naspag
.org/resource/resmgr/pdf’s/NASPAG_Statement_on_DSD_PES_.pdf [https://perma.cc
/59EA-U7VQ].
56. To clarify, the medical community sometimes refers to intersex traits as disorders
of sex development (DSD). See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 51, at e488.
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Ideally, if surgical interventions could be safely delayed, patients
would have time to express their gender identity and to be ac-
tively involved in the decision making process. True informed
consent or assent includes an accurate discussion of the options,
benefits, known short and long term complications, expected pain
and recovery, as well as need for reoperation. Finally, we believe
that if there is a possibility for fertility, that this should be pre-
served and optimized.57
The statement was endorsed by the Pediatric Endocrine Society,
another major medical professional association.58 Despite these wins
for intersex activists, the statements did not call for an end to genital
“normalizing” surgeries, and such medical interventions that con-
tinue to take place routinely around the United States and around
the world.
II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS UNDER U.S. LAW
In recent years, legal scholarship has grappled with the role of
law in the intersex community’s fight against medically unneces-
sary, non-consensual genital “normalizing” surgeries in the United
States. Though some disfavor legal interventions in this context,59
most scholars conclude that the law does indeed have a place in medi-
ating the competing rights at stake when addressing such surgeries.
By interrogating the proposed statutory or judicial solutions, this
part aims to highlight the tensions between children’s rights and
parents’ rights in U.S. law in this context and to underscore the need
to look at international human rights law as an additional legal
guidepost to understand this interplay.
A. Statutory Solutions
In response to calls for a moratorium on genital “normalizing”
surgeries from intersex activists, legal scholarship has explored the
viability of statutory solutions restricting the practice of such sur-
geries on children born with intersex traits.60 One such solution
calls for a ban on performing, aiding, or abetting such surgeries
unless a parent obtains an order from a family court.61 In justifying
57. NASPAG POSITION STATEMENT ON SURGICAL MANAGEMENT OF DSD, supra note 55.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Sara A. Aliabadi, Note, You Make Me Feel Like a Natural Woman: Al-
lowing Parents to Consent to Early Gender Assignment Surgeries for Their Intersexed
Infants, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 427, 427–28 (2005).
60. See supra text accompanying note 7.
61. Lloyd, supra note 18, at 190–92.
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this statutory approach, its proponents highlight that U.S. constitu-
tional law does not give parents absolute trust in protecting the
interests of their children.62 For instance, minors have an interest
in receiving life-saving medical treatment over their parents’ objec-
tions.63 Moreover, proponents point to statutes requiring neutral
third parties to determine the best medical interests of a child when
parents intend to subject their children to experimental medical
treatment, or when parents’ medical decisions implicate their chil-
dren’s substantive due process constitutional rights, like that of
procreation.64 Such medical cases represent “categorical conflicts of
interest” 65 between parents and children, a paradigm in which the
case of genital “normalizing” surgeries falls squarely. Consequently,
legislatures can and should vindicate children’s rights by statutorily
restricting the ability of parents to make the decision to perform
such surgeries on their children without court approval. Accord-
ingly, the proponents also call for a “standard of clear and convinc-
ing evidence of medical necessity, rather than the best interests of
the child, so to avoid placing undue weight on the wishes of the
parents, or the [hypothetical] psychological effects to the child.” 66
This statutory solution, Lloyd contends, will bring about an “open
62. Id. at 166–67. Though parents’ rights, including the rights to make decisions on
behalf of their children, are constitutionally protected, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 167 (1994), the Court noted that “the state has a wide range of power for
limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare[.]” Under
the doctrine of parens patriae, courts have recognized an ability to intervene when a
parent’s action or inaction may put a child’s health or life in jeopardy, or when it is in the
best interest of a child. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). See also Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) (“[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or
her children (i.e., is f it), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into
the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the
best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.”).
63. See, e.g., Jehovah’s Witnesses in the State of Wash. v. King Cty. Hosp., 278 F.
Supp. 488, 504–05 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (finding that a state can override parents’ religious
objections to blood transfusions when a child’s life or health is at risk), aff’d, 390 U.S. 598
(1968), reh’g denied 391 U.S. 961 (1968).
64. Lloyd, supra note 18, at 181–82. These statutes regulate when parents wish to do-
nate their children’s organs, remove life support for them, expose them to experimental
treatment, or force-sterilize them. The statutes include: ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-
302(a)(1)(B) (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302(a)(1)(C) (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-
302(a)(2)(A) (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-698 (2005); D.C. CODE § 21-2047(c)(1) (2005);
D.C. CODE § 21-2047(c)(3) (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-20-3 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-
12-13(4) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-01.2-09(4) (2005); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-9-17 (2005).
65. Lloyd, supra note 18, at 181. The author borrows this term from Jennifer L.
Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Parents Should Make Health Care
Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 43 (2000), and
uses it to “refer to circumstances where the risk of conflicts of interest is so high that
judicial intervention should always be called for, or to circumstances where the law
already imposes judicial intervention.” Id.
66. Id. at 190.
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exploration of the issues as they relate to a particular child”—a pro-
cess many individuals born with intersex traits are deprived of—
before a “neutral arbiter” in the less adversarial context of a family
court.67 Though comprehensive, this statute would likely require
significant political organizing to pass, as it significantly elevates
children’s rights at the expense of parents’ rights to make decisions
on behalf of their children and doctors’ discretion to recommend
surgeries. The proposal also has the downside of immediately ju-
dicializing a conflict between the interests of a child and those of his
or her parents before exploring nonjudicial mediation.
Anticipating some of these problems, another statutory proposal
recommends that the state act as parens patriae and require the
decision to perform such a surgery “to be independently approved by
a professional trained to act in the child’s best interests.” 68 Recog-
nizing that courts are indeed disinclined to permit interference with
parental rights to raise children as they wish, Puluka identifies that
an exception to this general rule exists when it comes to providing
children with life-saving treatment.69 In the case of children born
with intersex traits whose health and fundamental rights, including
their substantive due process right to privacy, are implicated,70 state
intervention is equally necessary.71 Puluka calls for states to require
that hospitals have available at least one social worker with a
background in intersex traits who can provide counseling to con-
fused parents and advise them to postpone any surgery that is
67. Id. at 188.
68. Puluka, supra note 20, at 2131.
69. Id. at 2123–27. The author notes that parents often refuse such treatment on the
basis of religious beliefs and courts are required to carefully weigh, inter alia, the
parents’ rights to freedom of religion and family autonomy with children’s interest in
receiving life-saving treatment. See People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769,
771–74 (Ill. 1952) (f inding that a child could be taken from a parent and placed with a
guardian when the parents refused to consent to a life-saving blood transfusion for the
child on religious grounds); In re Willmann, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1383, 1390 (Ohio Ct. App.
1986) (holding that parents’ religious decision not to consent to remove a malignant
tumor from a child’s arm was not protected under the Constitution); Commonwealth v.
Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 1152–53 (Pa. 2000) (f inding that parents could be held criminally
liable for “anointing” their deceased daughter in the church instead of providing medical
treatment for her sickness).
70. Puluka, supra note 20, at 2128 (“Genital surgery in infancy implicates the child’s
substantive due process right to privacy by depriving the child of the opportunity to define
his or her gender, an aspect of identity that will shape the child’s growth and have a
continuing impact throughout the child’s life.” ). Of course, the privacy rights implicated
include not only the right to define gender (which is still a tenuous right under U.S.
constitutional law), but also the more established rights to sexual expression, per Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574, 578 (2003), and, in many cases, to control reproduction, per,
inter alia, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
71. Puluka, supra note 20, at 2128.
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medically unnecessary.72 Only if it is then necessary to resolve
disputes between parents and the social worker should a case be
referred to a hospital ethics board or an administrative judge to de-
termine what is truly in the child’s best interest.73 “Such a law would
effectively do away with the concealment-based method of intersex
case management, instead allowing parents to understand their child’s
medical condition and avoid any adverse psychological impact that
the concealment-based model has traditionally caused.”74 “[R]equiring
consultation with a professional [with experience in the intersex con-
text], and possibly a neutral decisionmaker, states would be intruding
only minimally on the parent’s right to make medical decisions on
behalf of the child.” 75 This proposal appropriately takes a more
holistic stance, attempting to educate confused parents about what
their child’s intersex trait entails before resorting to judicial mecha-
nisms to vindicate a child’s fundamental rights.
A third proposed statutory scheme mandates a consultation
with a hospital ethics committee (HEC) comprised of diverse profes-
sionals and members of the intersex community, which would rec-
ommend a course of action to the doctors and parents considering a
genital “normalizing” surgery.76 Though the author acknowledges
and validates the concerns of the intersex community, she also indi-
cates that certain studies have shown successful outcomes of these
surgical interventions,77 that a moratorium could make doctors
fearful of performing medically necessary surgeries, and that par-
ents and others are, too, affected by a child’s intersex traits.78 For
this reason, the author proposes a “middle ground,” a mandatory
procedural process administered by an HEC that mediates between
all stakeholders, including “intersex[ ] children and the adults they
will become, their parents, and the medical community.” 79 This pro-
cess could encourage the expression of every viewpoint and option
for an infant before a decision is adopted.80 Though this approach
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2132–33 (internal citation omitted).
75. Id. at 2128–29.
76. Muckle, supra note 14, at 1020–22.
77. Id. at 1004 (citing Lisa Melton, New Perspectives on the Management of Intersex,
357 LANCET 2110, 2110 (2001); Arianne B. Dessens et al., Gender Dysphoria and Gender
Change in Chromosomal Females with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, 34 ARCHIVES
SEXUAL BEHAV. 389, 393 (2005); Susan J. Bradley et al., Experiment of Nurture: Ablatio
Penis at 2 Months, Sex Reassignment at 7 Months, and a Psychosexual Follow-up in
Young Adulthood, 102 PEDIATRICS 132, 132–33 (1998)).
78. Id. at 1004–05.
79. Id. at 1005.
80. Id.
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would allow for a thorough discussion of the issues, it has the poten-
tial of being a long, burdensome process with no differentiation
between parents who are already partially informed and those who
are not at all. A more tailored approach to the needs of parents and
their child would likely be more efficient and cost-effective.
B. Judicial Solutions
Finding that statutory solutions undesirable (because they are
not tailored to the specific situation) or impractical (because they
require political organizing), other legal scholarship relating to the
rights of children born with intersex traits has focused instead on
judicially imposed restrictions on the practice of genital “normaliz-
ing” surgeries. Certain judicial solutions have proposed a more
nuanced application of the informed consent doctrine81 to protect the
fundamental rights of children.82 For instance, one such proposal
calls for labeling the current model for treating ambiguous genitalia
as “experimental,” 83 an assessment that allows the treatments to be
held to the higher informed consent standard applied to other forms
of experimental treatment on infants.84 Another suggestion, high-
lighting higher informed consent standards proposed by different
81. The doctrine is based on the legal principle of battery, holding that “an offense to
personal dignity occurs when one person violates another’s bodily integrity without full
and valid consent.” See Kishka-Kamari Ford, Note, “First, Do No Harm”—The Fiction of
Legal Parental Consent to Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 19 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 469, 474–75 (2001). Generally, if a doctor attains “consent” from a patient
for a medical procedure, but does not fully inform a patient about the nature and conse-
quences of the procedure, the “consent” is not “informed.” Three criteria must be met before
a medical decision will be considered legally informed: 1) the decision must be informed,
requiring doctors to provide patients with adequate information, including alternatives,
regarding a treatment; 2) the decision must be voluntary, including free from coercion
or improper influence; 3) the decision must be competent, requiring that a patient “have
an ‘appreciation’ of the nature, extent, and probable consequence” of the procedure. Id.
82. Id. See also Alison Davidian, Beyond the Locker Room: Changing Narratives on
Early Surgery for Intersex Children, 26 WIS. J.L., GENDER & SOC’Y 1, 18–19 (2011);
Patricia L. Martin, Moving Toward an International Standard in Informed Consent: The
Impact of Intersexuality and the Internet on the Standard of Care, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL’Y 135, 136 (2002).
83. Ford, supra note 81, at 482.
84. Id. at 481–82 (“From the study of cases in the organ donation context, it becomes
apparent that in addition to the basic requirements of legal informed consent, certain
criteria must be satisfied before a parent may submit their minor to an experimental
treatment. First, if the treatment is not medically necessary for the minor, it must not be
unreasonably harmful. Second, the treatment must be to the benefit of the minor, and
not just to the benefit of the minor’s parents or other family members. The best interests
of the minor are at the forefront of the decision to permit or deny an experimental treat-
ment. With these criteria in mind, the arguments against allowing parental consent to
genital-normalizing surgery on their otherwise healthy intersexed infant are strong.”).
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domestic and local actors, suggests that courts can raise the in-
formed consent standard like the Constitutional Court of Colombia
did for intersex children in 1999.85 There, the Court established
there must be “ ‘qualified, persistent informed consent’ ” with the
following elements:
(1) Parental authority depends on the “exigency and urgency” of
the procedure, the invasiveness, and the “age and autonomy” of
the child.
(2) Parents may consent only if they have been given accurate
information about risks and alternate treatment protocols.
(3) Consent must be written, and must be given over an extended
period of time, not just at the initial surgery.
(4) Parents cannot consent for children over age five. These chil-
dren are autonomous, and have identified with a gender.86
Revisions of the informed consent standard effectively steer the
conversation away from parents’ rights versus children’s rights, and
towards the responsibilities of medical providers, alleviating some
of the legal tension in ruling on intersex issues.87
Another judicial solution takes the notion of rethinking the in-
formed consent standard and argues for a “categorical exception” to
the manner in which medical decisions are made for children born
with intersex traits that would give courts jurisdiction to intervene
and protect their fundamental rights.88 This proposal looks to the
existing categorical exceptions for a model of decision-making that
ensures the independent consideration of a child’s interests.89
Tamar-Mattis notes that genital “normalizing” surgeries on infants
implicate three major factors underlying the requirement of judicial
oversight in other contexts and which would allow judicial interven-
tion: “1) there is no demonstrated or expected medical benefit to the
procedure; 2) there is the potential for parental conflict of interest;
and 3) genital-normalizing surgeries can infringe on fundamental
rights of the child, namely those of bodily integrity, privacy, and
sometimes reproduction.”90 Unlike other solutions that call for judicial
85. Martin, supra note 82, at 166–67.
86. Id.
87. Cf. Claudia Wiesemann et al., Ethical principles and recommendations for the
medical management of differences of sex development (DSD)/intersex in children and
adolescents, 6 EUR. J. PEDIATRICS 671, 673 (2010).
88. See Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law’s Failure to Pro-
tect Intersex Infants, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 98–107 (2006).
89. Like Lloyd and Puluka, Tamar-Mattis draws from analogous jurisprudence on
parental conflicts of interest in the case of children who are potential organ donors or
who face elective sterilization. Id. at 98.
90. Id. at 99 (internal citation omitted).
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or third-party intervention to be mandated statutorily,91 the author
here argues that a courtroom strategy can be implemented without
political organizing.92 Moreover, she argues, this judicial interven-
tion may be more palatable to the general public than a moratorium
on the surgeries because “it is an individualized, best-interest
determination rather than a sweeping restriction.” 93 From a strate-
gic perspective, this proposal may be the easiest to execute.
Still another proposal considers a revision of the rule of negli-
gence in the medical malpractice context whereby physicians may be
held not merely to the prevailing custom or practice of similar physi-
cians,94 but also to that practice which is reasonable to expect given
the state of medical knowledge at the time of treatment.95 This revised
legal standard may motivate the medical community to re-evaluate
the medical protocol to treat children born with intersex traits to
avoid liability, especially since there are no large-scale studies of the
long-term outcomes of such surgeries (only small studies and anec-
dotal evidence suggesting that intersex surgeries are actually harm-
ful).96 The new standard may thus spur much-needed research and
may even immediately halt some of the most controversial surger-
ies. Nevertheless, it will likely not have a significant impact on the
majority of the current treatments for children as the subset of the
medical community—who created and perpetuate the current com-
mon medical protocol—would be responsible for questioning its own
methods and investing in long-term research goals.97 Moreover,
91. See, e.g., Lloyd, supra note 18, at 188.
92. Tamar-Mattis, supra note 88, at 103.
93. Id. at 104.
94. In general tort claims, a defendant is held to the standard of care which a “reason-
able person” would exercise under the circumstances. In medical tort claims, however,
physicians determine the standard of care to which the members of their profession are
legally held. For intersex individuals looking to sue their former surgeons for malpractice,
this means that their surgeon cannot be found negligent in most cases because the
professional standard of care was indeed what they will have followed. Hermer, supra
note 17, at 215.
95. Id. at 218–20.
96. Id. at 218. For one of the most recent and comprehensive studies, see TIFFANY
JONES ET AL., INTERSEX: STORIES AND STATISTICS FROM AUSTRALIA 3–4 (2006) (f inding,
inter alia, that “[m]ost participants considered their mental health as good (or positively)
at the time of the survey. The most frequently reported mental health diagnoses included
depression, anxiety and PTSD. Wellbeing risks were high—42% of participants had
thought about self-harm and 26% had engaged in it; 60% had thought about suicide and
19% had attempted it—specif ically on the basis of issues related to having a congenital
sex variation. The group mostly attributed their wellbeing risks to negative social re-
sponses from others, difficulties around having undergone interventions or issues around
gender/identity. Overall their mental health service experiences were mixed. Overall,
44% of the group reported receiving counselling/training/pressure from institutional prac-
titioners (doctors, psychologists etc.) on gendered behaviour; and 43% from parents. Many
participants desired improvements in training for mental health services/workers.” ).
97. Hermer, supra note 17, at 220.
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though it shifts the conversation from one of parents’ rights versus
children’s rights to one of medical responsibility, a judge would likely
be disinclined to revise a legal standard for one medical issue.98
Though a valid criticism of these judicial solutions is that they
essentially require an injured plaintiff to challenge the surgery
determination made on his behalf as a child (likely decades after the
determination is made), federal courts have seen one case relating
to the rights of children born with intersex traits. In 2013, the
Southern Poverty Law Center filed a lawsuit on behalf of the adop-
tive parents of M.C., a child who, at sixteen months old, underwent
a sex assignment surgery while he was in the care of the South
Carolina Department of Social Services.99 The plaintiffs alleged that
the State of South Carolina violated M.C.’s substantive due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment—including his right to
reproduction, bodily integrity, and privacy—when doctors surgically
removed “most of M.C.’s phallus, his testicle, and the testicular
tissue in his ovotestis” while he was in foster care.100 The plaintiffs
also alleged that the defendants violated M.C.’s procedural due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by subjecting M.C.
to this unnecessary surgery without notice or a hearing to deter-
mine whether the procedure was in M.C.’s best interest.101 The
Fourth Circuit ultimately dismissed the case under the qualified
immunity doctrine because it held that the defendants did not
violate M.C.’s “clearly established” constitutional rights.102 Though
this case involved a child in state and not parental custody, where
the state was making decisions on behalf of the child, it represents
the way other federal circuits and, ultimately the U.S. Supreme
Court, may look at the claims related to genital “normalizing”
surgeries. In light of this, the limits of viewing this issue exclusively
from the perspective of U.S. law becomes apparent. While the pa-
rameters of U.S. law can likely incorporate the rights of intersex
children, it may behoove activists to look at legal sources beyond
constitutional jurisprudence to make claims, particularly constitu-
tional ones, on behalf of intersex children or, later, adults.
98. It is noteworthy that certain advocates hold that parents are uninformed by their
doctors, and often are bullied or misled into approving surgery, and that they often
regret it afterwards. Those who are well-informed often will not choose surgery. So while
many doctors would like to frame this as parents’ rights versus children, it is really both
parents and children who are having their rights violated, to the detriment of the whole
family unit. That said, even fully informed parents may be willing to make this choice.
See supra note 42.
99. M.C. v. Aaronson, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/seeking-jus
tice/case-docket/mc-v-aaronson [http://perma.cc/7L5L-APER].
100. M.C. v. Amrhein, 598 F. App’x 143, 146–48 (4th Cir. 2015).
101. Id. at 149.
102. Id. at 149–50.
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III. A NEW LEGAL PERSPECTIVE: THE INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS FRAME
As outlined above, legal scholarship has proposed various solu-
tions that U.S. law can offer to mediate the tensions between chil-
dren’s rights and parents’ rights in the intersex context. While some
proposals find common ground,103 others contradict each other,104
underscoring the murkiness of U.S. law in this context. What aca-
demic literature has not fully scrutinized is what international
human rights law can offer to clarify this complex legal patchwork
of overlapping rights, an oversight this part aims to rectify. Indeed,
unlike U.S. constitutional law, international human rights law has
done more to theorize and accept children’s rights, and starts from
a much more affirmative position on the issue.105 From this under-
standing, this part will underscore the potential of international
human rights law to, inter alia, clarify U.S. constitutional protections
and fill gaps in constitutional jurisprudence, particularly with re-
gards to the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Section III.A will identify the human rights issues and
the relevant legal obligations that are at stake for children when it
comes to medically unnecessary, non-consensual genital “normaliz-
ing” surgeries. This section will also explicate the aforementioned
benefits of the human rights frame in this context.106 Section III.B
103. For instance, proposals requiring an intermediary—like a family court, a profes-
sional trained to act in a child’s best interests, or a hospital ethics committee—to approve
or guide any decision to perform a genital “normalizing” surgery on a child; or, proposals
reinterpreting or changing legal standards—like informed consent or negligence—to
abate such surgeries.
104. For example, proposals pushing for statutory solutions versus those that eschew
such interventions for concern that they are politically unfeasible.
105. See Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099,
2099 (2011) (“For almost two centuries, children were largely absent from the class of
constitutional rights-holders.” ); Jonathan Todres & Sarah Higinbotham, A Person’s a
Person: Children’s Rights in Children’s Literature, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 23
(2013) (“International human rights law recognizes that every child has rights. Adopted
by the U.N. General Assembly in 1989, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’)
offers the most comprehensive articulation of children’s rights, enshrining the civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights of the child.”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
The Constitutionalization of Children’s Rights: Incorporating Emerging Human Rights
into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 8–9 (1999) (“Children have few
clearly articulated or f irmly established constitutional rights in the United States of
America. Children enjoy few independent rights outside the context of criminal or
administrative proceedings, because children’s rights (generally called ‘interests’) are
conceptualized as subsumed within the rights of parents.” ).
106. For the purposes of this Article, I will compare international human rights law
to U.S. constitutional law, as the international legal regime generally focuses on the obliga-
tions of states as whole, and not on its federal subparts (though the international treaties
that the United States has ratified certainly bind them too). However, this is not to
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will then consider what international law says regarding parents’
rights. Lastly, Section III.C will untangle the tension between the
rights highlighted in the first two sections and begin to clarify what
a human rights–based solution can look like. It will do this by looking
at three parallel human rights issues where children’s rights and
parents’ rights are in conflict, namely female genital mutilation, child
marriage, and corporal punishment of children.
A. The Rights of Intersex Children: Human Rights Issues and
State Obligations
1. The Right to Liberty and Security of Person
Per its legally binding obligations under the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the United States must
protect an individual’s right to liberty and security of person.107 The
Human Rights Committee, the interpretative and monitoring treaty
body of the ICCPR, has explained that security of person under the
Covenant concerns freedom from injury to the body and the mind,
or bodily and mental integrity.108 Moreover, the Committee has spe-
cifically noted that States parties must respond to patterns of such
violence immediately, including when it is perpetuated against chil-
dren, persons with disabilities, and persons on the basis of their sexual
orientation or gender identity.109 This obligation exists irrespective
of whether the violence is perpetrated by state or private actors.110
Consequently, allowing the unrestricted practice of genital “nor-
malizing” surgeries on intersex children can amount to a violation
of the right to liberty and security of person under international
human rights law. As explained in Part I, these medical procedures
invariably inflict long-term and often debilitating physical and
psychological harm to children who exhibit uncommon biological
variations in sexual development.111 At times, these surgeries are
suggest that the U.S. state law is not relevant in this context. In fact, even in U.S. inter-
national legal scholarship, there are proposals to implement the United States’ interna-
tional legal obligations on a U.S. state level given the federal government’s unwillingness
to pass treaty implementing legislation. See, e.g., David Kaye, State Execution of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 95, 98 (2013).
107. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec.
Rep. 102-23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. See also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, at art. 3 (Dec. 10, 1948).
108. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 35, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35
(Dec. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35].
109. Id. ¶ 9.
110. Id.
111. See supra notes 42–45.
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also performed on the basis of unfounded fears of future atypical
sexual orientation or gender identity.112 Whether the harm is perpe-
trated by the state, such as in a public hospital, or by private actors,
such as in private clinics, the United States is under an obligation
to disallow the unrestricted practice of these surgeries.
While these protections and obligations may appear analogous
to those offered under the Substantive Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,113 the right to
liberty and security of person under international human rights
helps to fill some gaps in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. Firstly,
it is more unambiguous in its encompassing of mental integrity.
Though the right to bodily integrity has a long history and tradition
in U.S. constitutional law,114 the right to mental integrity does not
enjoy the same legal clarity.115 Despite the fact that the Constitution
protects freedoms such as those of religion and speech,116 these
constitute protections of “mental autonomy,” not of “mental integrity”
per se. The former protections connote freedom to engage in a variety
of intellectual or psychological endeavors or decisions, while the lat-
ter connote freedom from government interference that upsets one’s
intellectual or psychological capacities.117 Indeed, when constitutional
112. Greenberg, supra note 10, at 859–60.
113. The Substantive Due Process Clause protects rights that are deemed “funda-
mental” and prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
114. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 229 (2008). See also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720
(1997) (explaining that “in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of
Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right[ ]
to . . . bodily integrity”) (citations omitted); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)
(f inding that the use of capsules obtained by forcibly extracting them from a defendant’s
body as evidence in court violated the Due Process Clause); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (holding that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear
and unquestionable authority of law.”).
115. See Stephan Beyer, Comment, Madness and Medicine: The Forcible Adminis-
tration of Psychotropic Drugs, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 497, 503–04 n.30 (1980).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
117. Cf. id. An individual can make two different types of claims against a state:
“freedom to and freedom from.” As Beyer explains:
These freedoms are clearly correlative: freedom to tattoo one’s body involves
a freedom from state constraints upon tattooing; freedom from compulsory
state tattoos involves a freedom to keep one’s body untattooed. Yet there
remains an important conceptual distinction between freedom to tattoo
oneself if one wants and freedom from the state compelling one to be
tattooed if one does not. Freedom to (tattoo oneself, have an abortion, smoke
marijuana) may conveniently be called autonomy; freedom from (compulsory
tattoos, police searches of the rectum, unwanted blood transfusions) may
conveniently be called integrity.
Beyer, supra note 115, at 502 (internal citations omitted).
2018] THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 481
jurisprudence seems to suggest that the Constitution disallows
intrusion in one’s mental processes,118 it is generally referring to the
freedom to, for example, use contraceptives, possess obscene materi-
als, or have an abortion.119 On the other hand, international human
rights law bodies have been more explicit in holding that the protec-
tion of mental integrity is part of the right to liberty and security of
person,120 making it possible for activists to argue credibly that
people born with intersex traits have a right to be free from surger-
ies that harm their psychological well-being.121
118. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
119. One notable exception to this general tendency is illustrated by U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence on the government’s right to administer anti-psychotropic medication to per-
sons in the criminal justice system, including for the purposes of inducing competence to
stand trial. See, e.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003) (holding that “the
Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs
to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that
defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate,
is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial,
and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary signif icantly to further
important governmental trial-related interests.” ); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135
(1992) (f inding that the state did not satisfy due process requirements as it did not
demonstrate that treatment with antipsychotic medication was “medically appropriate,
and considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins’ own safety
or the safety of others”); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990) (holding that
a state prison’s involuntary medication procedures satisfied due process protections as
it provided “accommodation between an inmate’s liberty interest in avoiding the forced
administration of antipsychotic drugs and the State’s interests in providing appropriate
medical treatment to reduce the danger that an inmate suffering from a serious mental
disorder represents to himself or others.”).
120. For example, in a 2003 General Comment from the Committee on the Rights of
the Child on adolescent health and development, the Committee found that its Conven-
tion ensures “[p]rotection from all forms of abuse, neglect, violence and exploitation”
(emphasis added) and, in particular, “the physical, sexual and mental integrity of ado-
lescents with disabilities.” Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 4:
Adolescent Health and Development in the Context of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/4 (July 1, 2003) [hereinafter Comm. on the
Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc CRC/GC/2003/4]. In the context of violence against women,
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has explained that
its Convention offers protection from violence that includes “deprivations of liberty” like
“acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering.” Comm. on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against
Women, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/A/47/38 (1992).
Relating to “laws that allow for the deprivation of liberty,” the Committee on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities explained that people must even be free from all mental
health services or treatments that are not performed with the informed consent of the
person concerned. Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Consideration of
reports submitted by States parties under article 35 of the Convention (Spain), ¶ 36,
U.N. Doc CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1 (Oct. 19, 2011); Comm. on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 35 of the
Convention (Tunisia), ¶¶ 25, 28, U.N. Doc CRPD/C/TUN/CO/1 (May 13, 2011).
121. See Greenberg, supra note 10, at 859–60. It is true, however, that some doctors
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Secondly, unlike U.S. constitutional law, international human
rights law is unequivocal in holding that the right to bodily integrity
applies to children, as well as adults. Under U.S. law, the scope of
children’s bodily integrity is unclear beyond cases related to children
under government control, such as in school or juvenile detention
centers.122 Moreover, when parents consent to bodily interventions
on behalf of their children, constitutional protections for children’s
rights are fuzzy beyond the abortion and contraception contexts,
often being regulated by a patchwork of state statutory and common
law.123 Conversely, international human rights law has confirmed
that children have a right to bodily integrity in various other con-
texts, including at the expense of their parents’ rights to consent to
bodily interventions on their behalf.124 As will be elaborated upon in
Section III.C, this includes in the context of female genital mutila-
tion and corporal punishment.125
2. The Right to Respect for Private Life
In accordance with the ICCPR, the United States also has an
obligation not to arbitrarily or unlawfully interfere with one’s pri-
vacy or family.126 International human rights conceives of “privacy”
as a capacious term, and the Human Rights Committee has held
that it refers in part to “the sphere of a person’s life in which he or
she can freely express his or her identity, be it by entering into
relationships with others or alone.”127 It has thus found that it en-
compasses, inter alia, the right to choose one’s sexual identity and
engage in adult consensual sex in private,128 the right to choose
one’s own name,129 and the right to choose the way one looks and
one’s manner of dress.130 The term “family” is similarly elastic with
the Committee noting that the objectives of the Covenant demand
will argue that the surgeries are intended to benefit psychological well-being, though the
science is still inconclusive. See Creighton et al., supra note 21, at 6.
122. B. Jessie Hill, Constituting Children’s Bodily Integrity, 64 DUKE L. J. 1295,
1302–04 (2015).
123. Id. at 1304–08.
124. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, CRC/GC/2003/4, supra note 120, ¶ 8.
125. See infra notes 162–64.
126. ICCPR art. 17. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 12.
127. Coeriel v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 453/1991, ¶ 10.2 U.N. Doc. CCPR
/C/52/D/453/1991 (Oct. 31, 1994).
128. Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, ¶ 8.2 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50
/D/488/1992 (Mar. 31, 1994).
129. See Coeriel v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 453/1991, supra note 127,
¶ 10.2.
130. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 28, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1
/Rev.9 (Mar. 29, 2000).
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a broad interpretation of it in order to accommodate all culturally
specific understandings of it.131
The unrestricted practice of genital “normalizing” surgeries on
intersex children may thus constitute a violation of their right to
respect for private life under international human rights law. Indeed,
the surgeries may infringe upon a victims “privacy” by ultimately rob-
bing them of the opportunity to make fundamentally private decisions
about who they are and how they express that identity. For example,
the surgeries have a profound impact on victims’ sexual identities,
sexual practices, gender identities, and expected gender roles.132 The
surgeries also curtail victims’ rights to respect for their “family.” Not
only do victims report that the surgeries unduly influence their roles
in their immediate family settings, but some reported that the
surgeries—which may sterilize the victims—ultimately deprive
them of the choice to found a biological family.133
Again, U.S. constitutional law has comparable, but underdevel-
oped, protections for the right to respect for private life which inter-
national human rights law can help clarify. Although the U.S.
Constitution contains no express right to privacy, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that certain guarantees in the Constitution have
“penumbras” that create zones of privacy.134 Nevertheless, the Court
has invoked the privacy right in only a limited number of diverse
contexts, most notably in respecting aspects of an individual’s iden-
tity, like sexuality, and in respecting their right to parenthood and
to marriage.135 While it is true that human rights bodies have not
yet interpreted the right to privacy under international human
rights law to mandate respect for an individual’s intersex traits, it
is not unlikely that their understanding of the right as flexible
would permit this view, particularly in light of the right’s history in
yielding advances on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
131. See Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 16, ¶ 5 (Apr. 8, 1998).
132. See supra notes 42–45.
133. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 10, at 857–58.
134. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965).
135. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that the state cannot
criminalize “freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct,” or,
more narrowly, private, consensual sexual conduct); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973) (holding that the right to privacy encompasses the right to decide whether to
reproduce); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.” ). See also Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, at *3
(2015) (f inding that the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (f inding that sterilization amounts to the
denial of the fundamental right to procreation).
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identity on the international level.136 Indeed, this history began with
a series of cases that addressed the criminalization of consensual
homosexual conduct,137 but international bodies have further devel-
oped the right to privacy to include:
[A] more nuanced analysis of the obligations not to discriminate
and to guarantee equality in contexts such as the family, the
employment sector, in pension benefits, and in custody settings,
in order to prevent contravention of the right to equality, the
obligation not to discriminate, and the protection of the right to
privacy of persons.138
As the right continues to be interpreted internationally, it may thus
be strategic for activists to take advantage of its demonstrated
malleability and push for international human rights law to help
inform and develop U.S. constitutional privacy protections liberally
in this context.139
3. The Prohibition of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment
The United States is bound by the prohibition of torture and
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment under international
human rights law.140 Diverse acts can constitute torture and other
136. Rosa M. Celorio, The Case of Karen Atala and Daughters: Toward a Better
Understanding of Discrimination, Equality, and the Rights of Women, 15 CUNY L. REV.
335, 372 (2012).
137. See, e.g., S.L. v. Austria, App. No. 45330/99, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39 (2003); Dudgeon
v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3–4 (1981); Toonen v. Australia,
Communication No. 488/1992, supra note 128, ¶ 1.
138. Celorio, supra note 136, at 372. See also Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United
Kingdom, App. Nos. 31417/96 and 32377/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 12 (2000); Smith and Grady
v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, 136 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3 (1999);
Young v. Australia, Communication No. 941/2000, ¶¶ 10.4–13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78
/D/941/2000 (Aug. 6, 2003).
139. U.S. constitutional jurisprudence has indeed taken explicit note of developments
relating to the right to privacy under international human rights law. See, e.g., Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003) (noting four European Court of Human Rights
privacy decisions relating to consensual homosexual conduct and highlighting that “[t]he
right [of privacy] the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part
of human freedom in many other countries.” ).
140. ICCPR art. 7; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 2, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (Dec. 10,
1984) [hereinafter CAT]. The prohibition is also well established under customary inter-
national law as jus cogens, that is a norm from which no derogation is permitted. See The
Legal Prohibition Against Torture, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 1, 2004), https://www
.hrw.org/news/2003/03/11/legal-prohibition-against-torture [http://perma.cc/3XU5
-DBZP]. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 5. Notably, also U.S. law.
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cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.141 The mandate of the Spe-
cial Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment has recog-
nized that any medical intervention of an intrusive and irreversible
nature, when lacking a therapeutic purpose, may constitute torture
or ill-treatment if enforced or administered without the free and
informed consent of the person concerned.142 The mandate has also
highlighted that such medical interventions are especially suspect
when performed on patients from vulnerable groups—which includes
intersex populations143—“notwithstanding claims of good intentions
or medical necessity.”144
Permitting the practice of genital “normalizing” surgeries on
intersex children may thus rise to a violation of the prohibition of
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. As outlined in Part I,
the surgeries are often intrusive, irreversible, medically unneces-
sary, and routinely performed without the informed consent of
either the intersex child in question or the parents.145 To back these
findings, there is a growing consensus amongst international actors
that the surgeries can rise to the level of torture. In 2013, the Spe-
cial Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment, Juan E. Méndez, regretted that “[t]here
is an abundance of accounts and testimonies of persons being . . . sub-
jected to . . . a variety of forced procedures such as sterilization, . . .
hormone therapy and genital-normalizing surgeries under the guise
of so called ‘reparative therapies.’ ”146 Specifically, the Special Rap-
porteur explained that “[c]hildren who are born with atypical sex
characteristics are often subject to irreversible sex assignment,
involuntary sterilization, involuntary genital normalizing surgery,
performed without their informed consent, or that of their parents,
‘in an attempt to fix their sex,’ leaving them with permanent, irre-
versible infertility and causing severe mental suffering.”147 More-
over, the Committee Against Torture has, through its concluding
See 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (1994).
141. CAT art. 1.
142. Manfred Nowak (Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on torture and
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment), Torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, ¶¶ 40, 47, U.N. Doc. A/63/175 (July 28,
2008).
143. Juan E. Méndez (Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment) Rep. on torture and other cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment, ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/53 (Feb. 1, 2013).
144. Id. ¶ 32.
145. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30.
146. Méndez, supra note 143, ¶ 76.
147. Id. ¶ 77.
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observations mechanism, reprimanded six States parties to the
Torture Convention—Germany,148 Switzerland,149 Austria,150 Hong
Kong,151 Denmark,152 and France153—for their inaction towards
eliminating the practice of these surgeries. In every instance, the
Committee urged the States parties to take legislative, administra-
tive, or other measures to guarantee respect for the physical integ-
rity and autonomy of intersex persons. In 2015, the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) also cautioned
that the surgeries “may violate their rights to physical integrity, to
be free from torture and ill-treatment, and to live free from harmful
practices.”154 States parties to the Convention against Torture (CAT)
are obliged to protect persons from torturous treatment both in
public and private spaces, thus including where such practices are
committed by private clinics and physicians.155 A government that
allows torture to take place de facto consents to the practice and is
in breach of the Convention against Torture.156
Here, too, international human rights law can clarify U.S. con-
stitutional law’s analogous provisions on torture. U.S. constitutional
law has long prohibited torture, albeit not explicitly, per its ban on
“cruel and unusual punishments,”157 as well as relevant case law.158
148. Comm. against Torture, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under
Article 19 of the Convention (Germany), ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/DEU/CO/5 (Dec. 12, 2011).
149. Comm. against Torture, Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report
of Switzerland, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CHE/CO/7 (Sept. 7, 2015).
150. Comm. against Torture, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of
Austria, ¶ 44–45, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/AUT/CO/6 (Jan. 27, 2016).
151. Comm. against Torture, Concluding observations on the f ifth periodic report of
China with respect to Hong Kong, China, ¶¶ 28–29, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CHN-HKG/CO/5
(Feb. 3, 2016).
152. Comm. against Torture, Concluding observations on the combined sixth and seventh
periodic reports of Denmark, ¶¶ 42–43, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/DNK/CO/6-7 (Feb. 4, 2016).
153. Comm. against Torture, Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report
of France, ¶¶ 34–35, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/FRA/CO/7 (June 10, 2016).
154. Fact Sheet: Intersex, supra note 9.
155. Comm. against Torture, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, General Comment No. 2, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008).
156. Id. ¶ 18.
157. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
158. See DAVID LUBAN, TORTURE, POWER, AND LAW 204 (2014). The relevant case law
includes Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that off icial “conduct
that shocks the conscience” violates the constitutional guarantee of due process of law);
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (f inding that torture is still
prohibited, even when Paraguayan victims sued their home-state torturers in U.S. court);
and U.S. v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 281 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that a criminal suspect
could not be tried if allegations that he was tortured while being brought to the United 
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Notably, the United States has also passed legislation implementing
the CAT, which, though only applicable to conduct “outside the
United States,”159 provides a working definition of torture under
U.S. law: “an act committed by a person acting under the color of law
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suf-
fering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions)
upon another person within his custody or physical control.”160
Neither the Eighth Amendment nor CAT legislation jurisprudence
has considered that genital “normalizing” surgeries can rise to
torture. The international human rights regime can thus be helpful
for activists looking to highlight the dire consequences of such sur-
geries. It can also help to inform the interpretation of torture under
U.S. constitutional law.
4. Other Relevant Rights
The rights above were presented in detail because they are
legally binding to the United States. In other words, the right to
liberty and security of person, the right to respect for private life,
and the right to be free from torture and inhumane or degrading
treatment are found in treaties that the United States has signed
and ratified. However, there is a world of important human rights
treaties that the U.S. federal government has signed but not rati-
fied, or on which it has not taken any action at all.161 Some of these
treaties—including the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)—are sources of impor-
tant rights and state obligations that, while not formally binding on
the United States,162 reveal the full potential of international human
States were true). See also Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Consti-
tutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278, 281 (2003)
(arguing that torture is barred by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) (1994).
160. Id. § 2340(1).
161. For an overview of some of these treaties, including some not pertinent to the
intersex context, as well as the importance of ratif ication, see generally United States
Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 24,
2009, 12:24 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/24/united-states-ratification-interna
tional-human-rights-treaties [http://perma.cc/8XUF-4UEQ].
162. There is, however, some debate on the extent that signing but not ratifying a
treaty imposes obligations on the signing state. For example, some scholars note that
signatory states are bound not to violate any of the “core” or “important” provisions in
the treaty. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Unratif ied Treaties, Domestic Politics, and
the U.S. Constitution, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 308 (2007).
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rights law in this context.163 One of these rights, particularly impor-
tant in the intersex context, is the right to health. Similarly, the
rights of the child (although not a single right but rather a collection
of rights and principles applied to children), recognized in the CRC,
are especially pertinent.
The right to health164 is enshrined in Article 12 of the ICESCR,
Articles 17, 23, and 24 of the CRC, Article 25 of the CRPD, and
Article 12 of CEDAW.165 According to this right, everyone has the
right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health, without discrimination. People born with intersex traits
could therefore have two potential claims under this right when it
comes to genital “normalizing” surgeries: they have a right to not be
subjected to treatment that will be detrimental to their physical and
mental health; and they have the right to access medical care that
is appropriate and respectful of the sex characteristics with which
they were born.166 The rights of the child, on the other hand, are
guaranteed, generally, by the CRC. Though many articles in the
Convention are relevant to children born with intersex traits, Arti-
cle 3, establishing that the “best interests” of the child should be the
primary consideration in decisions affecting them,167 and Article 12,
guaranteeing a child’s right to increasingly form and express his or
her views freely regarding such decisions as he or she grows,168 are
particularly salient. Read together, the articles could be interpreted
to require that surgeries permanently modifying children’s bodies
and affecting their sexual function and fertility be expressly con-
sented to by the children in line with their best interests.169 It
should also be noted that while the federal government has not
assumed international obligations with regards to the right to health
163. Indeed, many of these Conventions’ treaty bodies have already issued statements
denouncing the practice of genital “normalizing” surgeries. See Corte Constitucional
[C.C.] [Constitutional Court], octubre 23, 1995, Sentencia T-477/95 (p. 5–7) (Colom.).
164. Although not a treaty, the right is also mentioned in Article 25 of the UDHR, a
document the United States has signed. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 25.
165. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 25, December 13, 2006,
46 I.L.M. 433, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 [hereinafter CRPD]; Convention on the Rights
of the Child arts. 17, 23, 24, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989), corrected at
29. I.L.M. 1340 (1990) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC]; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]; Comm. on the Elimi-
nation of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 24, ¶ 1 U.N.
Doc. A/54/38 (1999).
166.  COUNCIL OF EUR. COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERSEX
PEOPLE 32 (2015), https://rm.coe.int/16806da5d4 [http://perma.cc/JNR8-456B].
167. CRC art. 3.
168. Id. at art. 12.
169. COUNCIL OF EUR. COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 166, at 33.
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and rights of the child, many state-level governments are ahead of the
curve and have provided citizens these rights. For instance, thirteen
state constitutions refer to the right to health specifically.170
B. The Rights of Parents: The Integrity of Family Under
International Law
In the face of the human rights issues described above is the
right to the integrity of family, an aspect of the right to respect for pri-
vate life protected by international human rights law.171 Constituting
the integrity of the family involves weighing a variety of competing
values, including the special rights of children (like those described
in Section III.A) and the rights of adults to raise children. Unsur-
prisingly, international law fails to clearly resolve the tensions
between these values given that they are “held and deeply contested
among and [even] within cultures.”172 That said, Article 17 of the
ICCPR states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to unlawful attacks upon his honour and reputation. . . . Everyone
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference
170. See generally Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to
Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 1347 n. 91 (2010) (citing ALA. CONST. art. IV,
§ 93.12; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 4; ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 19; HAW. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1,
3; ILL. CONST. pmbl.; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 8; MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 51; MISS. CONST. art.
IV, § 86; MO. CONST. Art. 4, § 37; MONT. CONST. art II, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. 17, §§ 1, 3; S.C.
CONST. art. XII, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 20).
171. ICCPR arts. 17, 23; Universal Declaration of Human Rights arts. 12, 16. Though
the right to the integrity of family is often engaged in cases where, for example, the State
separates family members by, inter alia, deporting one member of a family group (see,
e.g., Human Rights Comm., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶¶ 6.3,
7.1, 7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000 (Aug. 16, 2001)), the right has been invoked
in areas analogous to the rights of intersex children. For instance:
A number of countries have declared the applicability of child protection laws
to female genital mutilation, while others have enacted and applied specific
provisions for the elimination of harmful practices, including female genital
mutilation. Child protection laws provide for state intervention in cases in
which the State has reason to believe that child abuse has occurred or may oc-
cur. They may enable authorities to remove a girl from her family or the
country if there is reason to believe that she will be subjected to female genital
mutilation. These laws focus on ensuring the best interests of the child.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. ET AL., ELIMINATING FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: AN INTERAGENCY
STATEMENT 18 (2008), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw52/statements_mis
sions/Interagency_Statement_on_Eliminating_FGM.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y5VJ-47WD]. For
an overview of the diverse cases that Europe has interpreted this right in, see generally
Parental Rights, EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Oct. 2017), http://www.echr.coe.int/Doc
uments/FS_Parental_ENG.pdf [http://perma.cc/53K6-EQRB].
172. Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International
Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213, 213–14 (2003).
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or attacks.”173 Therefore, whatever the vagueness of international
human rights law on the aforementioned tensions may be, “arbitrari-
ness” is the legal standard by which a potential interference with the
family needs to be measured, including one looking to address par-
ents’ decision-making relating to the intersex traits of their children.
It is useful to look at other relevant human rights instruments
to inform what a nonarbitrary, or lawful, interference in the family
context might look like. As the seminal modern human rights docu-
ment, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides some
guidance, stating that:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of moral-
ity, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.174
A reading of the right to the integrity of family that is in the spirit
of human rights is thus informed by this limitation, an approach
that has indeed been validated by regional human rights mecha-
nisms.175 Specifically, the consideration of “the rights and freedoms
of others” when interpreting the right to the integrity of family is in
harmony with other obligations that the United States has under
international human rights law, including the obligation to protect
the human rights of children by virtue of their status as minors.176
The case of intersex children who undergo genital “normalizing”
surgeries thus warrants a nonarbitrary interference with the right
to the integrity of family in light of the human rights violations
obligating the United States to intervene, as well as the fact that
173. ICCPR art. 17 (emphasis added).
174. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 29.
175. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides similar protec-
tion to family integrity, but it spells out explicitly the conditions under which the state
may interfere with family life:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos.
3,5,8, and 11 which entered into force on 21 Sept. 1970, 20 Dec. 1971, 1 Jan. 1990, and
1 Nov. 1998 respectively [hereinafter ECHR] (emphasis added).
176. Id. See also Article 24(1) of the ICCPR: “Every child shall have, without any dis-
crimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or
birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor,
on the part of his family, society and the State.”
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the surgeries are often carried out at the request of intersex chil-
dren’s parents. The interference must thus constrain a parent’s
ability to consent to the practice of genital “normalizing” surgeries
on their children born with intersex traits. However, this lawful
interference could be, but is not necessarily, a blanket ban as the
interference must simply have the sole purpose of “securing due
recognition and respect” for the rights of intersex children, including
their right to liberty and security of person, their right to respect for
private life, and their right to be free from torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment. As this is new legal territory, it is helpful to
refer, as will be done in the next section, to analogous human rights
issues where parents’ rights are also at stake to understand what
might constitute a lawful interference in parents’ rights.
On an even more doctrinal level, however, framing the rights of
parents using international human rights law offers a distinct advan-
tage to activists. It is true that international human rights law, like
U.S. constitutional law, shows deference to parental rights. While the
U.S. Supreme Court consistently holds that the Due Process Clause
“protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concern-
ing the care, custody, and control of their children,”177 the human
rights regime upholds the right to integrity of family. Nevertheless,
the way the two different bodies of law envision a curtailment of
parental rights is noteworthy. The Supreme Court developed the
doctrine of parens patriae, which states have often invoked to protect
the welfare of children in cases of child abuse, and which activists
have contemplated in the fight against genital “normalizing” surger-
ies.178 In defining the doctrine, the Court has noted that the state
has a “quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both
physical and economic—of its residents in general.”179 Though this
constitutional doctrine mirrors the doctrine of a nonarbitrary inter-
ference in the family under international human rights law, the
latter is more forceful. While parens patriae is conceived as an interest
that the state has in protecting children, a nonarbitrary interfer-
ence, on the other hand, is a legal obligation under international
law as a consequence of the children’s rights that are at stake. In
terms of advocating for a legislative solution to the situation of
children born with intersex traits, the international human rights
frame may thus prove more useful, at least rhetorically.
177. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion). See also Puluka,
supra note 20, at 2115–18.
178. Puluka, supra note 20, at 2118.
179. Id. (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R. ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607
(1982)). For an in-depth overview of the doctrine, see id. at 2118–27.
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C. Untangling The Rights of Children and Parents’ Rights:
Lessons from Other Human Rights Issues
Lawful interferences in the rights of parents to raise children
is not unprecedented and has been prescribed in other contexts by
international human rights law. For instance, in the comparable
context of female genital mutilation (FGM),180 a practice often per-
petrated against young girls at the behest of their parents,181 the
Human Rights Committee limited parents’ abilities to make deci-
sions for daughters. Citing Articles 7 and 24 of the ICCPR, the
Committee vindicated a girl’s right to be free from torture and non-
consensual medical experimentation by suggesting that States parties
take measures, including protective and remedial measures, to elimi-
nate the practice.182 Other persuasive international treaty bodies
have also taken similar positions on the supremacy of children’s
rights over parents’ rights when it comes to FGM. Though they did
not engage in a balancing inquiry per se, the Committee on the
Rights of the Child, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation against Women, and the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights have all upheld girls’ and adolescents’ rights to
health and have mandated protections for girls against the “harmful
traditional practice,” including via legislative intervention, monitor-
ing mechanisms, awareness-raising campaigns, and education pro-
grams.183 In essence, human rights law seems to suggest that when
180. FGM, also called “female genital cutting”:
[R]efers to all procedures involving partial or total removal of the external
female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical
reasons. Between 100 and 140 million girls and women in the world are esti-
mated to have undergone such procedures, and 3 million girls are estimated
to be at risk of undergoing the procedures every year.
See WORLD HEALTH ORG. ET AL., supra note 171, at 1. FGM “violates a series of well-estab-
lished human rights principles, norms and standards, including the principles of equality
and non-discrimination on the basis of sex, the right to life when the procedure results
in death, . . . the right to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment...[and] the right to the highest attainable standard of health.” Id. at 9.
181. Id. See also Nigeria: Whether parents can refuse female genital mutilation for their
daughters; protection available to the child, IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN. (Nov. 21,
2012), http://www.refworld.org/docid/50c84b9c2.html [http://perma.cc/F7MF-NU2R].
182. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The Equality
of Rights Between Men and Women), ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/REV.1/ADD.10
(Mar. 29, 2000).
183. See, e.g., Comm. on the Rights of the Child, CRC/GC/2003/4, supra note 120, ¶¶ 20,
35; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), ¶¶ 22, 35, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4
(Aug. 11, 2000); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW
General Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health), ¶¶ 12,
15, U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1 (1999); Comm. on the Elimination of Violence against Women,
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the medical repercussions on children are as severe as in this con-
text, and the only reason for engaging in the practice is tradition,
children’s rights must prevail at the expense of parental wishes.184
Another context where international human rights law limits
parents’ rights to the benefit of children’s rights is in the case of child
marriage,185 a practice whose underlying causes include a “parental
desire to prevent sexual relations outside marriage and the fear of
rape. . . and traditional notions of the primary role of women and
girls as wives and mothers.”186 The Human Rights Committee has
indicated that the age for marriage must enable each spouse to give
his or her free and full consent pursuant to Article 23 of the ICCPR,
even when one of the factors motivating the marriage is “statutory
or customary law [whereby] a guardian, who is generally male, con-
sents to the marriage instead of the woman herself. . . .”187 Moreover,
it has urged states, albeit not always explicitly referencing parents’
rights, that they must ensure that the minimum age complies with
international standards, adopt active measures to prevent early
marriage of girls, and generally promote awareness of children’s
General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, ¶¶ 20, 24, U.N. Doc. A/47/38
(1992); Comm. on the Elimination of Violence against Women, CEDAW General Recom-
mendation No. 14: Female Circumcision, U.N. Doc. A/45/38 (1990).
184. It is noteworthy that United States federal law prohibits FGM, thus unequivocally
limiting parental rights in this area. See 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2013) (stipulating “(a) Except
as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates the
whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of another person who
has not attained the age of 18 years shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 5 years, or both. (b) A surgical operation is not a violation of this section if the opera-
tion is—(1) necessary to the health of the person on whom it is performed, and is performed
by a person licensed in the place of its performance as a medical practitioner; . . . (c) In
applying subsection (b)(1), no account shall be taken of the effect on the person on whom
the operation is to be performed of any belief on the part of that person, or any other
person, that the operation is required as a matter of custom or ritual.”). 24 states in the
United States also have laws against FGM. Some activists note that FGM is akin to
“normalizing” surgeries in certain cases and that those laws could potentially apply in
this context, at least with regards to intersex females. See, e.g., Sylvan Fraser, Constructing
the female body: using female genital mutilation law to address genital-normalizing surgery
on intersex children in the United States, 9 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. IN HEALTHCARE 62, 66 (2016).
185. Child marriage impacts millions of children, particularly girls, around the world.
The practice violates different “interconnected rights, including, the right to equality on
grounds of sex and age, the right to marry and found a family, the right to life, the right
to the highest attainable standard of health, the right to education and development and
the right to be free from slavery. . . .” UNICEF, CHILD MARRIAGE AND THE LAW: LEGIS-
LATIVE REFORM INITIATIVE PAPER SERIES I (2007), https://www.unicef.org/french/f iles
/Child_Marriage_and_the_Law.pdf [http://perma.cc/M8M5-MWBQ].
186. Id. at 31.
187. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The equality of rights
between men and women), ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (Mar. 29, 2000). See
also Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 19: Article 23 (The Family) Protection
of the Family, the Right to Marriage and Equality of the Spouses, ¶ 4 (July 27, 1990).
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rights.188 Similarly, the Committee Against Torture has recognized
that child marriages consented to by guardians may constitute cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment, particularly where governments
have failed to establish a minimum age of marriage that complies
with international standards.189 Other interpretative bodies of
international human rights law that have prescribed an end to child
marriage at the expense of parental rights include the Committee
on the Rights of the Child, the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, the Special Rapporteur on the sale
of children, child prostitution and child pornography, and the Spe-
cial Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its
causes and consequences.190 Though human rights bodies in this
context have not explicitly engaged in balancing inquiries vis-à-vis
parents’ rights, they acknowledge the victims’ lack of consent and
the role of guardians as particularly problematic. Their unequivocal
188. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Concluding observations on the f ifth periodic
report of Uruguay, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/URY/CO/5 (Dec. 2, 2013); Human Rights
Comm., Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee, Islamic Republic of Iran,
¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/IRN/CO/3 (Nov. 29, 2011); Human Rights Comm., Concluding obser-
vations of the Human Rights Committee, Kuwait, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/KWT/CO/2
(Nov. 18, 2011); Human Rights Comm., Concluding observations of the Human Rights
Committee, Yemen, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/75/YEM (Aug. 12, 2002).
189. See Comm. against Torture, Concluding observations of the Committee against
Torture, Yemen, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/YEM/CO/2/Rev.1 (May 25, 2010). See also Comm.
against Torture, Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture, Bulgaria,
¶ 26, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/BGR/CO/4-5 (Dec. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Comm. against Torture,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/BGR/CO/4-5].
190. See, e.g., Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations: Togo, ¶¶ 30,
58, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/TGO/CO/3-4 (Mar. 8, 2012); Comm. against Torture, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/BGR/CO/4-5, supra note 189, ¶ 26; Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation against Women, Montenegro, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MNE/CO/1 (Nov. 4, 2011);
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding observations
of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Zambia, ¶¶
13–14, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ZMB/CO/5-6 (Sept. 19, 2011); Najat Maalla M’jid (Special
Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and pornography), Building rights-
based and comprehensive national child protection systems to prevent and combat the
sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. A/66/228
(Aug. 2, 2011); Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations: Mauritania,
¶ 62, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/MRT/CO/2 (June 17, 2009). See also Gulnara Shahinian (Special
Rapporteur on the contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences),
Mission to Madagascar (10 to 19 December 2012), ¶ 125, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/43/Add.2
(July 24, 2013); Gulnara Shahinian (Special Rapporteur on the contemporary forms of
slavery, including its causes and consequences), Thematic report on challenges and
lessons in combating contemporary forms of slavery, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/43 (July 1,
2013); Gulnara Shahinian (Special Rapporteur on the contemporary forms of slavery,
including its causes and consequences), Thematic report on servile marriage, ¶ 14, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/21/41 (July 10, 2012); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, General recommendation No. 21: Equality in marriage and family relations,
¶ 36 (Apr. 12, 1994).
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vindication of children’s rights over parents’ rights here thus sug-
gests that it is not that parents cannot consent for children, but
rather that the magnitude of consenting for a child in this context
is too great, warranting an interference in parents’ rights.
A final example of an area of international human rights law
where parental rights are significantly limited is corporal punish-
ment of children.191 For instance, in reference to the prohibition
pursuant to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
pursuant to Article 7 of the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee
explained that “the prohibition must extend to corporal punishment,
including excessive chastisement ordered . . . as an educative or
disciplinary measure” and that “[i]t is appropriate to emphasize in
this regard that article 7 protects, in particular, children. . . .”192 Sim-
ilarly, the Committee Against Torture declared that the “continuing
application” of corporal punishment “could constitute in itself a
violation. . . of the Convention.”193 Meanwhile, the Committee on the
Rights of the Child held that Article 19 of the Convention “does not
leave room for any level of legalized violence against children” and
that “[c]orporal punishment and other cruel or degrading forms of
punishment are forms of violence and States must take all appropri-
ate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to
eliminate them.”194 Other persuasive bodies that have interpreted
international human rights law to limit parental rights in this context
include the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.195
On the contrary, international human rights law does not
always categorically vindicate the alleged rights of a child and will
show deference to the rights of parents in certain contexts. For
191. According to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, corporal punishment is:
[A]ny punishment in which physical force is used and intended to cause some
degree of pain or discomfort, however light. Most involves hitting (“smacking”,
“slapping”, “spanking”) children, with the hand or with an implement—a
whip, stick, belt, shoe, wooden spoon, etc. But it can also involve, for ex-
ample, kicking, shaking or throwing children, scratching, pinching, biting,
pulling hair or boxing ears, forcing children to stay in uncomfortable positions,
burning, scalding or forced ingestion (for example, washing children’s mouths
out with soap or forcing them to swallow hot spices).
Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 8 (2006), The right of the child
to protection from corporal punishment and other cruel or degrading forms of punish-
ment (arts. 19; 28, para. 2; and 37, inter alia), ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/8 (June 2, 2006).
192. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of
Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), ¶ 5
(Mar. 10, 1992).
193. Comm. against Torture, Rep. of the Committee against Torture, ¶ 169, U.N. Doc.
A/50/44 (July 26, 1995).
194. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, supra note 191, ¶ 18.
195. See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13: The
Right to Education (Art. 13), ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (Dec. 8, 1999).
496 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW           [  V    o l. 24:459
example, in one European Court of Human Rights case interpreting
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
(the equivalent of Article 17 of the ICCPR196), a married couple com-
plained about the state’s removal of their two adopted children and
the revocation of their adoption.197 The state did this following an
incident during which the adopted son “was badly burnt at home
and had to go to hospital for treatment,” an event that made author-
ities suspect child abuse.198 Despite the very serious allegation against
the parents, putting their interests in tension with those of the adop-
tive children, “the Court [found] that the Russian courts had made
a superficial assessment of the allegation that the [plaintiffs] had
failed to look after the children’s health.”199 It held that suspicion
alone was insufficient to warrant the extreme decision to revoke the
adoption.200 Moreover, no assessment had been made as to the
emotional bond between the children and parents, which may have
been strong enough to trigger emotional distress following separa-
tion.201 In addition, the Court found that the fact that the parents
and children were separated for a period of fourteen months also
constituted a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR given its extrem-
ity.202 In essence, international human rights law demands a thor-
ough examination of the facts and relevant factors before the right
to respect for family life is infringed.
From these examples, the manner in which international hu-
man rights law mediates between children’s rights and parent’s
rights becomes clearer. On the one hand, the field will often cham-
pion the rights of children when it comes to, inter alia, their right to
liberty and security of person, their right to marry and found a
family, and their right to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. Indeed, international human
rights bodies demand that States parties take concrete measures,
including legislative, protective, and remedial measures, to elimi-
nate the problematic practices, not just to limit them. A human
rights–based, nonarbitrary solution to the problems posed by genital
196. Compare ECHR art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence”) with ICCPR art. 17 (“No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”).
197. Eur. Ct. H.R. Press Release No. 122, Decision to revoke adoption based on un-
proven suspicion of child abuse was unjustified (Apr. 18, 2013) (reporting on the Court’s
judgement on Ageyevy v. Russia, application no. 7075/10).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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“normalizing” surgeries might thus look like a statutory ban on per-
forming, aiding, or abetting such surgeries, such as the ones presented
in Section II.A. On the other hand, however, international human
rights law does not completely eclipse or disregard the parents in
the contexts presented above. First, it recognizes that parents’
consent to harmful practices like FGM, child marriage, and corporal
punishment are rooted in “traditional practices.” 203 In response to
this, international human rights law accentuates the need for
awareness-raising for parents, including via campaigns and educa-
tion programs.204 Whereas the U.S. law-based solutions in Part II
present awareness-raising as an aftereffect (if at all), international
human rights requires this to be an integral part of a state-sanctioned
solution. Moreover, the legal regime requires a thorough investiga-
tion of the facts of a case before the rights of parents are curtailed
indefinitely.
IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW’S ROLE
THUS FAR AND ITS POTENTIAL
As presented in Part III, international human rights law re-
quires governments to protect the rights of children born with inter-
sex traits. The legal regime also provides guidance on how best to do
this in the face of competing children’s rights and parents’ rights.
However, beyond these outlined capabilities, international human
rights law has already had a concrete impact on progress in the
intersex context around the world. Drawing from developments in
Colombia, Chile, and Malta, this Part aims to critically examine the
practical role that international human rights law has played in
ending or limiting the practice of medically unnecessary, non-con-
sensual genital “normalizing” surgeries and mediating between chil-
dren’s and parents’ rights. More importantly, through this analysis,
this Part sheds light on how the legal regime and its institutions
can be harnessed strategically to effect change, particularly in the
United States. Section IV.A will look at how the discourse of inter-
national human rights and state obligations have given intersex
activists in Colombia leverage to vindicate their grievances in un-
charted legal territory. Section IV.B will then address how institu-
tions created by international human rights law, particularly treaty
bodies and their mechanisms, have helped shape positive develop-
ments in Chile. Lastly, Section IV.C will discuss how international
203. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 171.
204. Id.
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human rights advocacy networks, spurred by the human rights re-
gime, have helped to bring about change in Malta.
A. Colombia: Leveraging International Human Rights & State
Obligations
It was not until the late 1990s that human rights and other
legal considerations entered the public discourse surrounding the
medical predicament of people born with intersex traits.205 Until
then, activists, at least in the United States, mainly employed media
visibility as an advocacy tool.206 However, once a “rights” discourse
began to develop, activists started, for example, to attend legal con-
ferences, look to broader legal issues, and consolidate struggles
transnationally to contextualize their concerns.207 Indeed, the lan-
guage of “rights,” as well as that of corresponding state obligations,
gave intersex activists a tool with which to successfully articulate
and push for an issue that does not fit neatly in existing domestic
laws, including as it relates to the tension between children’s versus
parents’ rights. This is particularly observable in Colombia where
a series of decisions by the Constitutional Court of Colombia be-
tween 1995 and 2008 not only changed the treatment of children
born with intersex traits, but also showcased the power of framing
“normalizing” surgeries as human rights violations in court.
In Sentencia T-477/95, the Court considered the case of a
teenager who, after finding out that he had been accidentally cas-
trated as an infant and subsequently subjected to sex reassignment
surgery and raised as a girl, sued the doctors and hospital responsi-
ble.208 There, the Court found that the sex of a child could not be
altered without the child’s informed consent.209 A few years later, in
Sentencia SU-377/99, the seminal intersex case, the Court was con-
fronted with a mother’s suit to compel a hospital wary of Sentencia
T-477/95 to accept her consent to genital surgery for her eight-year-
old child born with an intersex trait.210 Finding that the need for
parental consent decreases with age and that by the age of five
205. Sharon E. Preves, Out of the O.R. and into the Streets: Exploring the Impact of
Intersex Media Activism, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 247, 278–79 (2005).
206. Id. at 277–79.
207. Id. at 279.
208. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.][Constitutional Court], octubre 23, 1995, Sentencia
T-477/95 (p. 5–7 )(Colom.).
209. Id. at 33 (“El expreso consentimiento informado del propio paciente es indispensable
para cualquier tratamiento médico de readecuación del sexo.”).
210. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.][Constitutional Court], mayo 12, 1999, Sentencia
SU-377/99 (p. 4–5) (Colom.).
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children have developed a gender identity,211 the Court held that the
mother’s consent could not be substituted for that of the eight-year-
old child in this case.212 However, the Court also held that, in certain
situations, parental consent could be substituted if it was “informed,
qualified, and persistent.” 213 Later, in Sentencia T-912/08, the
Court applied its earlier reasoning to hold that parental consent
could not be substituted for that of a five-year-old intersex child.214
There, it held that once all the facts were known, the child and the
parents together could give joint consent, but no surgery could be
performed if the child’s decision did not accord with that of his
parents.215
Though Sentencia SU-377/99, the seminal intersex case, did
not ban genital “normalizing” surgeries, it severely limited parents’
abilities to consent to these surgeries on behalf of their children using,
inter alia, international human rights legal standards. With no juris-
prudence on intersex issues at the time,216 activists like the Intersex
Society of North America (ISNA) rushed to present the Court with
legal arguments that “[b]oth the Nuremberg Code and basic princi-
ples of human rights law prohibit subjecting a child to . . . [such]
surgeries.” 217 Listening to activists, the Court looked to its ICCPR
and CRC obligations, in addition to the Colombian Constitution, for
guidance.218 In finding the aforementioned limitations on parents’
abilities to consent for their children, the Court noted that, in accor-
211. Id. at 51 (“[A] los cinco años un menor no sólo ha desarrollado una identidad de
género definida sino que, además, tiene conciencia de lo que sucede con su cuerpo y
posee una autonomía suficiente para manifestar distintos papeles de género y expresar
sus deseos.”).
212. Id. at 52 (“Por ende, la Corte concluye que, como no existe un evidente riesgo de
que se comprometa el derecho a la vida de la menor si no se practica la operación, no es
posible que, en el presente caso, la madre autorice la intervención y los tratamientos
hormonales para su hija, que ya tiene más de ocho años. Por consiguiente, esas inter-
venciones sólo podrán ser adelantadas con el consentimiento informado de NN y por ello
la tutela no debe ser concedida, pues no se acogerá la solicitud concreta de la madre que
pretendía la autorización de los procedimientos. Sin embargo, es necesario que el juez
constitucional tome las medidas necesarias para proteger los derechos fundamentales
de la menor.”).
213. Id. at 50 (“. . . la niña puede contar con especial apoyo de su madre, quien deberá
gozar de un ‘consentimiento informado, cualif icado y persistente[.]’ ” ).
214. Corte Constitucional [C.C.][Constitutional Court], septiembre 18, 2008, Sentencia
T-912/08 (p. 1)(Colom.).
215. Id. at 7.
216. Corte Constitucional [C.C.][Constitutional Court], mayo 12, 1999, Sentencia SU-
377/99 (p. 5) (Colom.).
217. ISNA’s Amicus Brief on Intersex Genital Surgery, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM. 5
(Feb. 7, 1998), http://www.isna.org/node/97 [http://perma.cc/2TH8-2BQR].
218. The Court actually thanked ISNA for its collaboration in its opinion and referenced
it and its documents more than 25 times. See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.][Constitu-
tional Court], mayo 12, 1999, Sentencia SU-377/99 (n. 78) (Colom.) (thanking ISNA).
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dance with Article 7 of the ICCPR, patients have the right to decide
if they will participate in medical procedures on the basis of objec-
tive understanding of all the risks and benefits.219 It also observed
that, per Article 12 of the CRC, children must be accorded an in-
creasingly certain level of autonomy relating to issues that affect
them as they grow, including when it comes to medical decisions
that impact them.220 Addressing parents’ rights directly, the Court
points out that while human rights treaties do recognize parents’
rights to raise their children,221 including their ability to consent to
medical procedures on their child’s behalf, this right is not limitless.
It highlights that Article 19 of the CRC mandates that states adopt
all measures to protect children against any form of harm or physi-
cal or mental abuse even while they are under the custody of their
parents.222 It also acknowledges that under Article 20, the CRC even
requires the state to provide special assistance to children in cases
where their best interest is to be temporarily or permanently sepa-
rated from their parents.223 Buttressing its arguments with the
discourse of international human rights and state obligations in an
underdeveloped area of the law, the Court, partially at the behest
of activists, was able to reach a conclusion that moved the needle
forward for the rights of people born with intersex traits.
B. Chile: Using International Human Rights Mechanisms
In addition to taking advantage of the “rights-obligations” dis-
course under international human rights law, intersex activists
have also benefited from another feature of international human
rights law: treaty bodies and their mechanisms. When states accede
to international human rights treaties, they also consent to having
“treaty bodies” monitor their implementation of the treaties via
procedures that include periodic reporting obligations.224 Generally,
under the reporting procedure, governments will submit reports to
a human rights treaty body about their implementation of that treaty,
which will be followed by a discussion of these reports with govern-
ments in public proceedings where domestic NGOs and the press
219. Id. ¶ 12.
220. Id. ¶ 23.
221. Id. ¶ 39.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. For an overview of the state reporting processes of international human rights
treaty bodies, see PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
SUCCESSOR TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 768–89 (2012).
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may be present.225 Before these public proceedings, however, NGOs
are also permitted to submit “shadow reports” to the treaty body
that serve both to critique the government’s report, as well as to
raise other human rights issues not present in the government’s
report.226 These shadow reports, if accurate, detailed, and concise,
may have a huge impact on the discussion and, ultimately, on the
government’s engagement with troublesome or omitted issues.227
Activists around the world take regular advantage of this mecha-
nism to challenge their governments’ positions on human rights,
including in the intersex context.228
225. Id. at 768.
226. Id. at 769.
227. Id. For assessments of the goals and eff icacy of the state reporting procedures
and NGO shadow reports, see Human Rights Comm. A Strategic Approach to Public
Relations, Including Relations with the Media, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/3 (Jan. 15, 2009);
U.N. Secretariat, Concept Paper on the Commissioner’s Proposal for a Unified Standing
Treaty Body, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2006/2 (Mar. 22, 2006); Ann Marie Clark, The norma-
tive context of human rights criticism: treaty ratification and UN mechanisms, in THE
PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE 125–44
(Thomas Risse et al. eds. 2013).
228. To date, activists have succeeded in using the state reporting mechanism of six
different treaty bodies (Committee against Torture, Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, and the Human Rights Committee) to highlight the conditions of intersex
children in sixteen countries (Australia, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong
(China), Ireland, Italy, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, South Africa,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, Uruguay). See Human Rights Comm., Concluding obser-
vations on the sixth periodic report of Australia, ¶¶ 25–26, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/AUS/CO/6
(Nov. 9, 2017); Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the f ifth
periodic report of Denmark, ¶¶ 12, 24, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/DNK/CO/5 (Oct. 26, 2017);
Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations on the initial
report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶¶ 40–41, U.N.
Doc. CRPD/C/GBR/CO/1 (Oct. 3, 2017); Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
Concluding observations on the initial report of Morocco, ¶¶ 36–37, U.N. Doc. CRPD
/C/MAR/CO/1 (Sept. 5, 2017); Human Rights Comm., Concluding observations on the
fourth periodic report of Switzerland, ¶¶ 24–25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CHE/CO/4 (Aug. 22,
2017); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding
observations on the combined seventh and eighth periodic reports of France, ¶¶ 18–19,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/FRA/CO/7-8 (July 25, 2016); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Australia, ¶¶ 49–50, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/AUS/CO/5 (July 11, 2017); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, Concluding observations on the combined sixth and seventh periodic
reports of Ireland, ¶¶ 24–25, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/IRL/CO/6-7 (Mar. 9, 2017); Comm. on
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding observations on the com-
bined seventh and eighth periodic reports of Germany, ¶¶ 23–24, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C
/DEU/CO/7-8 (Mar. 9, 2017); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
Concluding observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of Switzerland,
¶¶ 24–25, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHE/CO/4-5 (Nov. 25, 2016); Comm. on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report
of the Netherlands, ¶¶ 21–22, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/6 (Nov. 24, 2016); Comm.
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Chile is a country where activists looking for government regu-
lation on this issue succeeded in leveraging the outcome of these
reporting procedures to compel action from the government, culmi-
nating in the country’s landmark directive on the “healthcare of
intersex boys and girls” in December 2015.229 This directive, issued
by the Ministry of Health, calls for a stop to “unnecessary ‘normaliza-
tion’ treatments for intersex children, including irreversible genital
surgeries, until they are old enough to make decisions regarding
their bodies.” 230 The release of this guidance is the first time that a
on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of
South Africa, ¶¶ 23–24, 39–40, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/ZAF/CO/2 (Oct. 27, 2016); Comm. on
the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of New
Zealand, ¶¶ 15, 25, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/NZL/CO/5 (Oct. 21, 2016); Comm. on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations on the initial report of Uruguay,
¶¶ 43–44, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/URY/CO/1 (Sept. 30, 2016); Comm. on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, Concluding observations on the initial report of Italy, ¶¶ 45–46, U.N.
Doc. CRPD/C/ITA/CO/1 (Oct. 6, 2016); Comm. against Torture, Concluding observations
on the seventh periodic report of France, ¶¶ 34–35, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/FRA/CO/7 (June 10,
2016); Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined third
to f ifth periodic reports of Nepal, ¶¶ 41–42, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/NPL/CO/3-5 (July 8, 2016);
Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the f ifth periodic report
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶¶ 21–22, 46–49, 58–59,
64–65, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GBR/CO/5 (July 12, 2016); Comm. on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, Concluding observations on the initial report of Chile, ¶¶ 41–42, U.N. Doc.
CRPD/C/CHL/CO/1 (Apr. 13, 2016); Comm. against Torture, Concluding observations on
the sixth and seventh periodic reports of Denmark, ¶¶ 42–43, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/DNK
/CO/6-7 (Feb. 4, 2016); Comm. against Torture, Concluding observations on the f ifth
periodic report of China with respect to Hong Kong, China, ¶¶ 28–29, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/CHN-HKG/CO/5 (Feb. 3, 2016); Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding
observations on the f ifth periodic report of France, ¶¶ 47–48, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/FRA/CO
/5 (Feb. 23, 2016); Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the
combined third and fourth periodic reports of Ireland, ¶¶ 27–28, 39–40, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/IRL/CO/3-4 (Mar. 1, 2016); Comm. against Torture, Concluding observations on
the sixth periodic report of Austria, ¶¶ 44–45, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/AUT/CO/6 (Jan. 27,
2016); Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined
fourth and f ifth periodic reports of Chile, ¶¶ 24–25, 34–35, 48–49, U.N. Doc. CRC/C
/CHL/CO/4-5 (Oct. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Comm. on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/CHL/CO/4-5]; Comm. against Torture, Concluding observations on the seventh
periodic report of Switzerland, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CHE/CO/7 (Sept. 7, 2015); Comm.
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations on the initial report
of Germany, ¶¶ 37–38, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/DEU/CO/1 (May 13, 2015); Comm. on the
Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined second to fourth periodic
reports of Switzerland, ¶¶ 42–43, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/CHE/CO/2-4 (Feb. 26, 2015); Comm.
against Torture, Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture, Germany,
¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/DEU/CO/5 (Nov. 18, 2011); Comm. on the Rights of the Child,
Concluding observations on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Spain, ¶ 24,
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/ESP/CO/5-6 (Feb. 2, 2018).
229. MINISTERIO DE SALUD, CIRCULAR NO. 18: INSTRUYE SOBRE CIERTOS ASPECTOS DE
LA ATENCIÓN DE SALUD A NIÑOS Y NIÑAS INTERSEX (2015), https://oii.org.au/wp-con
tent/uploads/2016/01/Circular-08-22.12.15-Instruye-Sobre-Ciertos-Aspectos-de-la-aten
cion-de-Salud-a-Ninos-y-Ninas-Intersex.pdf [http://perma.cc/VY9C-N5AA].
230. Id. (author’s translation).
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governmental health agency has, independently of legislation or
legal action, taken such a step in recognition of the human rights of
people born with intersex traits. Notably, the directive also calls for
the creation of a working group in every regional Health Service
“staffed by professionals from different specializations, including
endocrinology, gynecology, psychiatry, pediatrics, family doctor,
that, together with the ethics committee of the Health Service, shall
determine what action to take. This proposal will come before a
central committee for final review during preparation of a protocol
that will regulate treatment.” 231
Like with the Colombian Constitutional Court and Sentencia
SU-377/99, the Chilean Ministry of Health grounded its directive
quite explicitly in international human rights law and, particularly,
in the findings of international human rights mechanisms. In 2015,
the Committee on the Rights of the Child addressed Chile’s record
on intersex surgeries during its periodic reporting cycle.232 Chilean
intersex activists were present during the public proceedings.233 In
its Concluding Observations, the Committee recommended that
Chile “expedite the development and implementation of a rights-
based health-care protocol for intersex children that sets the proce-
dures and steps to be followed by health teams. . . [to] protect the
rights of the children concerned to physical and mental integrity,
autonomy and self-determination. . . .” 234 Spurred by activists’
demands, the Chilean Ministry of Health’s landmark directive on
the medical treatment of children born with intersex traits alludes
precisely to these concerns and recommendations to develop a
protocol “to ensure people born with intersex conditions will not be
subjected to surgeries until they are old enough to make decisions
on their bodies themselves.” 235 Remarkably, the government also
acknowledged that the creation of such a protocol “means the recog-
nition of the progressive autonomy of children as a cross-cutting
principle of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by
the Chilean government in 1990.” 236 The directive also references
231. Id. (author’s translation).
232. See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/CHL/CO/4-5, supra note
228, ¶ 48.
233. Morgan Carpenter, Chilean Ministry of Health issues instructions stopping “normal-
ising” interventions on intersex children, ORG. INTERSEX INT’L AUSTL. LTD. (Jan. 11,
2016), https://oii.org.au/30250/chilean-ministry-stops-normalising [http://perma.cc/LKV9
-8R46] (Andrés Rivera Duarte “appeared as a civil society representative before the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child in Geneva” in 2015).
234. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/CHL/CO/4-5, supra note 228,
¶ 49.
235. MINISTERIO DE SALUD, supra note 229 (author’s translation).
236. Id. (author’s translation).
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other human rights mechanisms, albeit in less detail. It acknowl-
edges the findings of the Human Rights Committee and the Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights regarding genital
“normalizing” surgeries,237 as well as findings by the regional Inter-
American System of Human Rights in 2013 and 2015 that such
surgeries are systematic violations of human rights and possibly
constitute torture.238
While it would be hasty to overstate the Committee’s influence
on a government’s decision-making, the lack of mention of Chilean
law in the directive suggests that the treaty body’s reporting mecha-
nism did provide additional impetus and guidance for the Chilean
government to take this issue on. Moreover, one of the activists
behind the campaign in Chile explained that when meeting with the
Minister of Health and her advisors, he only “gave them a draft hu-
man rights protocol, . . .United Nations reports, and general human
rights information” and that “[t]hat day they promised to change the
situation and to create a working group.”239 Leveraging the country’s
obligations under the international legal regime and its mechanisms,
activists in Chile looking for government regulation succeeded in
getting their government to effect change for people born with
intersex traits.
C. Malta: Tapping into Human Rights Transnational Advocacy
Networks
For activists, equally important to the rights-obligations para-
digm and the mechanisms of international human rights law is the
framework that the system provides for the socialization of these
international rights in domestic systems. This framework, which
some political scientists have aimed to capture and called the “spiral
model” of human rights change,240 is composed of causal relation-
ships between various state and non-state actors and associated
237. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/CHL/CO/4-5, supra note 228,
¶¶ 48–49.
238. See Inter-American Judicial Committee, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and
Gender Expression CJI/doc.417/12, at 5 (2013), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs/ijc
_current_agenda_Sexual_orientation.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6DV-Y394]; INTER-AMERICAN
COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, VIOLENCE AGAINST LGBTI PERSONS, ¶¶ 182–95 (2015),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/ViolenceLGBTIPersons.pdf [https://perma.cc
/65Z3-9X5Z].
239. Carpenter, supra note 233.
240. This model was f irst developed in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 3 (Thomas Risse et al. eds. 1999) and later revisited in
THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE 5–7
(Thomas Risse et al. eds. 2013) [hereinafter THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS].
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processes that ultimately lead to “behavioral change and sustained
compliance with international human rights.” 241 Some of these
relationships have been labeled “transnational advocacy networks,”
i.e., the web of interactions between activists united by human rights
principles or values.242 These networks, by linking civil societies,
states, and international organizations, increase exchange and may
contribute to the convergence of social and cultural norms regionally
and internationally.243 Where domestic political and judicial actors
are unwilling to recognize rights, individuals and domestic groups
may develop and activate these networks to express their concerns
and, in the most egregious situations, to protect their lives.244 In ad-
dition, they may also aim to mobilize international allies to bring
pressure on their government, a strategy of influence political scien-
tists have called “the boomerang pattern.” 245 Under this scheme,
contacts abroad can “ ‘amplify’ the demands of domestic groups, pry
open space for new issues, and then echo these demands back into
the domestic arena” 246 in the hopes of prompting a change in the
behavior of a state. The networks’ strategies may include: 1) “infor-
mation politics, [i.e.,] the ability to strategically move politically
[salient] information quickly and credibly. . . ”; 2) “symbolic politics,”
i.e., the ability to effectively employ symbols, actions, or stories to
portray a situation or argument to a removed audience; 3) “leverage
politics,” i.e., the ability to prompt powerful actors to intervene in con-
texts where members of a network are unlikely to have influence;
and 4) “accountability politics,” i.e., the ability to compel powerful
actors to act in accordance with policies or principles they have
formally endorsed.247 Today, with cheaper air travel and more ac-
cessible communication technologies, as well as the proliferation of
international organizations and conferences, initiating and main-
taining these networks is increasingly feasible for human rights
activists.248 These networks have played a key role in the positive
developments in the intersex context, most notably in Malta.
In Malta, transnational human rights advocacy networks played
a pivotal role in precipitating the most celebrated development
241. See Introduction and Overview to THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 240, at 7.
242. Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational advocacy networks in
international and regional politics, 51 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 89, 89–101 (1999).
243. Id. at 89.
244. Id. at 93.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 95.
248. Keck & Sikkink, supra note 242, at 95.
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recognizing the rights of people born with intersex traits: Malta’s
April 2015 Gender Identity, Gender Expression, and Sex Character-
istics (GIGESC) Act.249 In adopting this law, Malta became the first
country in the world to ban genital “normalizing” surgeries on infants
and young children born with intersex traits.250 The Act makes it
illegal “for medical practitioners or other professionals to conduct
any sex assignment treatment and, or surgical intervention on the
sex characteristics of a minor which treatment and, or intervention
can be deferred until the person to be treated can provide informed
consent.” 251 The Act also takes note of “exceptional circumstances”
for which treatment may be provided and not deferred once agree-
ment is reached between an “interdisciplinary team” and a child’s
guardians, provided that the medical intervention is not “driven by
social factors.” 252 The Act mandates that the interdisciplinary team
be appointed by the Minister of Social Dialogue, Consumer Affairs,
and Civil Liberties and composed of relevant professionals.253
This extraordinary legislative achievement by activists was
thanks, in part, to transnational advocacy networks opening up the
political space. For example, a prominent voice in the passage of the
bill, the Human Rights Policy Coordinator at the Maltese Ministry
for Social Dialogue, Consumer Affairs, and Civil Liberties, had pre-
viously helped to bring together a global intersex community through
his work at the International Gay, Lesbian, Transsexual, Transgen-
der, and Intersex Association (ILGA),254 an international federation
of organizations campaigning for LGBTI rights.255 In a display of
“information politics” and “leverage politics,” 256 he had helped to
create the first ever international convention of intersex advocates
249. Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics Act, Act No. XI of
2015 (Malta), http://tgeu.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Malta_GIGESC_trans_law
_2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/8DHT-ZWM8]. For examples of activists celebrating its pas-
sage and highlighting the human rights standards that underpin the law, see Leslie J.,
A Red Letter Day as Malta Makes History!, ORG. INTERSEX INT’L IN THE U.K. (Apr. 1,
2015), http://oiiuk.org/1027/a-red-letter-day-as-malta-makes-history [https://perma.cc
/B2U6-V478]; Malta the First Country to Outlaw Forced Surgical Intervention on Intersex
Minors, STAR OBSERVER (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.starobserver.com.au/news/interna
tional-news-news/malta-passes-law-outlawing-forced-surgical-intervention-on-intersex
-minors/134800 [https://perma.cc/66AY-XZDX].
250. See supra text accompanying note 249.
251. GENDER IDENTITY, GENDER EXPRESSION AND SEX CHARACTERISTICS ACT § 15(1)
(Malta) (2015).
252. Id. § 15(2).
253. Id. § 15(3–4).
254. Mark Hay, What Will Malta’s New Intersex Law Mean for the Rest of the World?,
VICE (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/exqn77/maltas-new-intersex-leg
islation-is-the-most-progressive-in-the-world-192 [http://perma.cc/S329-W2CM].
255. About Us, ILGA, http://ilga.org/about-us [http://perma.cc/HB4A-VTKC].
256. See Keck & Sikkink, supra note 242, at 95.
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called the International Intersex Forum during his tenure at ILGA,
a gathering he and other activists later brought to Malta and to
which they invited the Maltese Minister for Social Dialogue, Con-
sumer Affairs, and Civil Liberties.257 Indeed, the provisions of the
Act have been seen by activists worldwide to meet several key
demands of the Public Statement by the Third International Intersex
Forum drafted in Malta by “34 activists representing 30 intersex
organisations from all continents.” 258 Moreover, the Minister con-
firmed that the government considered the “constructive feedback”
of international human rights groups,259 including GATE, ILGA-
Europe, OII Australia, OII Europe, STP, Transgender Europe, and
UNHCR, during the bill’s public consultation.260 Further evidence
of the work of transnational advocacy networks in the passage of the
Act is that, like with the developments in Colombia and Chile, the
discourse of international human rights overtly informs the relevant
provisions of the Act. In the most obvious display of this, the Act
predicates the prohibition of “normalizing” surgeries on the coun-
try’s obligation to protect the “right to bodily integrity and physical
autonomy,” a human right that did not explicitly exist under Maltese
domestic law previously and was, in fact, introduced by the Act.261
While new to the Maltese legal system, the right to bodily integrity
and physical autonomy has long been cultivated by international
human rights law,262 a fact of which the Act takes advantage.263
257. See Hay, supra note 254.
258. See Public Statement by the Third International Intersex Forum, ILGA EUR.,
https://www.ilga-europe.org/print/what-we-do/our-advocacy-work/trans-and-intersex
/intersex/events/3rd-international-intersex-forum [https://perma.cc/7T6G-KFXR]. See
also Morgan Carpenter, We celebrate Maltese protections for intersex people, ORG. INTER-
SEX INT’L AUSTL. LTD. (Apr. 2, 2015), https://oii.org.au/28592/we-celebrate-maltese-pro
tections-for-intersex-people [https://perma.cc/4MD8-4LC2].
259. Helena Dalli, Malta breaks EU taboo on trans-gender rights, EU OBSERVER
(Apr. 17, 2015), https://euobserver.com/opinion/128364 [https://perma.cc/NC3A-BGJ3].
260. MINISTRY FOR SOC. DIALOGUE, CONSUMER AFFAIRS, & CIVIL LIBERTIES, GENDER
IDENTITY, GENDER EXPRESSION AND SEX CHARACTERISTIC ACT: PUBLIC CONSULTATION
(Oct. 29, 2014), http://meae.gov.mt/en/Public_Consultations/MSDC/Documents/2014%20
-%20GIGESC/Public%20Consultation%20GIGESC%20Final%20-en.pdf [https://perma.cc
/XT3S-8347].
261. Id. (The proposal “introduces a right to bodily integrity and physical autonomy
for all persons[.]” ).
262. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 3; Human Rights Comm.,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35, supra note 108, ¶ 3; ICCPR art. 9.
263. See, e.g., Ronald Cassar, Malta and LGBTIQ equality, one year on, TIMES OF
MALTA (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20160914/life-%20
features/malta-and-lgbtiq-equality-one-year-on.624868 [https://perma.cc/7F8W-TSHA]
(quoting Gabi Calleja, Chairwoman of the LGBTIQ Consultative Council, an advisory body
set up by Malta’s Minister for Social Dialogue, Consumer Affairs and Civil Liberties,
which developed the GIGESC bill: “With respect to the right to bodily integrity and the
protection of intersex persons, there was the challenge of developing the legal text
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V. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW’S POTENTIAL FOR
INTERSEX RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
As demonstrated above, international human rights law has
helped to effect change for intersex children around the world, both
in the courts and in legislatures. In the United States, it too can play
a role by complementing and strengthening domestic legal claims.
For example, when analyzing the impact of medically unnecessary
genital “normalizing” surgeries on children’s substantive due pro-
cess rights, legal arguments can take advantage of the analyses that
international legal institutions have already undertaken with re-
spect to the right to liberty and security of person and the right to
respect for private life to fill in gaps in constitutional jurisprudence.
Even these institutions’ take on how “normalizing” surgeries may
amount to violations of the right to be free from torture and inhu-
man or degrading treatment may prove useful. Though the torture
argument may seem unorthodox in the United States—particularly
as the country continues to become recalcitrant on this particular
human rights issue264—framing the problem in this manner may
raise the stakes for triers of fact and garner heightened legal atten-
tion to the issue.265 Interpretations of the rights to health and the
rights of the child, while not technically binding to the United States,
can also help inform legal reasoning around this issue as they help
without much to rely on, given that Malta was the f irst to establish such protections. I
believe that the ministry’s broad consultation with international organisations active in
the f ield of LGBTIQ rights was hugely beneficial in this process. . . .” ). Other provisions
of the Act also show deference to the international legal regime. For example, the Act
mandates that the Minister of Social Dialogue, Consumer Affairs, and Civil Liberties,
in consultation with the Minister of Health, appoint a working group to review the
current medical treatment protocols for intersex traits, a group that must include three
experts in human rights issues. Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Charac-
teristics Act, Act. No. XI of 2015 §16 (Malta) (2015). Given that the working group is to
have only nine experts (the others being from the medical and psychosocial f ields), the
Act seems to recognize the extent to which international human rights law played a role
in the passage of this law. In addition, in cases where a minor born with an intersex trait
later expresses a desire to undergo genital surgery and his or her guardian consents,
medical professionals shall, inter alia, “ensure that the best interests of the child as
expressed in the Convention on the Rights of the Child be the paramount consideration.”
Id. § 14(5)(a). This explicit reference to the CRC standard also recognizes the value of
the international legal frame in this context.
264. See, e.g., USA and Torture: A History of Hypocrisy, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 9,
2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/09/usa-and-torture-history-hypocrisy [https://
perma.cc/L393-WYGD].
265. See, e.g., Pierre Mouriquand et al., The ESPU/SPU standpoint on the surgical
management of Disorders of Sex Development (DSD), 10 J. PEDIATRIC UROLOGY 8, 8
(2014) (explaining, in either disbelief or annoyance, that “surgical management of DSD
has been the target for much criticism coming from various sources including a recent
UN report on torture (!) [sic] and a Swiss ethical committee.”).
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to underscore what legal standards should look like. This may be
particularly persuasive since many U.S. state constitutions do have
specific provisions relating to these rights,266 demonstrating that
these rights are not foreign to the U.S. legal system. Indeed, where
direct legal precedent is scarce, as is the case with intersex rights,
legal arguments enhanced by international legal authorities may
have a significant persuasive character.
In that same vein, activists in the United States seeking legal
resolutions should continue to resort to advocacy and adjudication
before treaty body mechanisms to which the United States is held
accountable, including the Human Rights Committee and the Com-
mittee Against Torture. With at least one U.S. court showing reluc-
tance to adjudicate claims relating to intersex children,267 these
international institutions are an ideal venue to begin obtaining
authoritative judgments relating to the practice of genital “normaliz-
ing” surgeries in the United States. Moreover, these institutions
have shown their willingness to issue statements on this issue and
continue to do so regularly. Though it is true that in the United States
the influence of these human rights institutions may depend signifi-
cantly on an administration’s position on the United Nations and
international law more generally—a reality that given the election
of Donald J. Trump as President is worrying268—a Committee may
compel the United States to at least acknowledge the issue and
“shame” it publicly through its review system.269 Though the result
may not be as fruitful as it was in Chile, these official responses to
the activists’ complaints could serve as an effective tool in advocacy
and, in the long term, facilitate change with a new administration.
Moreover, these decisions directed at the United States may partic-
ularly impact the decisions of U.S. courts given the lack of legal
precedent, as explained above.
Finally, the power of transnational intersex rights human rights
networks, like the ones that were at play in Malta, should not be
overlooked. Activists can push for bringing the International Inter-
sex Forum to the United States, which can help spur a comparative
legal perspective as the United States reexamines its stance on this
266. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 170, at 1325.
267. M.C. v. Amrhein, 598 F. App’x 143, 149–50 (4th Cir. 2015).
268. Cf. Max Fisher, What Is Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/12/world/what-is-donald-trumps-foreign-policy
.html [http://perma.cc/UZJ6-4TEK]; Carol Morello, Iran nuclear deal could collapse
under Trump, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national
-security/iran-nuclear-deal-could-collapse-under-trump/2016/11/09/f2d2bd02-a68c-11e6-ba
59-a7d93165c6d4_story.html?utm_term=.71d344980cb8 [http://perma.cc/V6UC-DDRY].
269. See supra text accompanying note 228.
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issue. For instance, examining what other constitutional structures
are capable of achieving for children in this context and how the
human rights system plays a role in that change may reveal possi-
bilities in the United States. Moreover, given the fact that the “nor-
malizing” surgeries originated in the United States, activists around
the world may welcome a change in this country in particular. An
event such as this in the United States could also garner the atten-
tion of the mainstream media to the benefit of domestic campaigns
since the issue may be considered as affecting more people. In
addition to hosting such an event, activists in the United States
could take advantage of these advocacy networks to connect with
activists from countries like Chile and Malta, where intersex rights
have been recognized, to get their governments to push the United
States to shift its position. The influence of such countries on the
United States may be magnified in official forums like the UN
Universal Periodic Review.270
CONCLUSION
In response to the agonizing repercussions that medically
unnecessary, non-consensual, “normalizing” surgeries have on the
lives of children born with intersex traits, U.S. legal scholarship has
dutifully put forth solutions that may begin to address some of the
issues that this common medical protocol presents to children in the
United States. Scholars have even begun to address the thorny
tension between children’s rights and parents’ rights in this context.
Nevertheless, scholarship has largely ignored the role and potential
of international human rights law in pushing for change and, in
particular, mediating between the rights of parents and their chil-
dren born with intersex traits. By clarifying how this legal regime
fills gaps in underdeveloped U.S. constitutional jurisprudence with
regards to “normalizing” surgeries, this Article hoped to push schol-
ars and advocates in the United States to more actively employ this
frame. In addition to presenting the regime’s capabilities, this Article
also aimed to present examples of positive developments where
270. Universal Periodic Review, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx [https://perma.cc/7ECP-
VEVP] (“The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a unique process which involves a
review of the human rights records of all UN Member States. The UPR is a State-driven
process, under the auspices of the Human Rights Council, which provides the opportunity
for each State to declare what actions they have taken to improve the human rights
situations in their countries and to fulf il their human rights obligations. As one of the
main features of the Council, the UPR is designed to ensure equal treatment for every
country when their human rights situations are assessed.”).
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international human rights law, both doctrinally and institutionally,
has played a successful role in shifting the status quo for intersex
children. Though the legal regime can help to effect change in the
United States in a myriad of ways, this Article ended with three
distinct observations that may help promote a paradigm shift for
intersex children in the United States.
Given the speed at which international human rights law is
recognizing the rights of people born with intersex traits, there will
likely soon be even more authoritative sources of international law
demanding that the United States change course. Indeed, intersex
rights may even experience the same unexpected cascading success
that the recognition of some transgender rights has had in recent
years, thanks, in part, to the work of international institutions.271
Though it may seem more convenient and effective for scholars and
advocates to focus on domestic legal strategies as a means of change
in the United States, to do so would disregard the immense potential
of the international legal regime. In addition, it would sacrifice the
wealth of knowledge and connections that viewing the issue more uni-
versally can bring to advocates locally. As the legal community begins
to employ the human rights frame more seriously, victims of “nor-
malizing” surgeries may begin to see a change in the way that the
United States approaches the medical procedures. More importantly,
the universalist frame may begin to help victims like Daniela272
regain the dignity that has often been taken from them.
271. See, e.g., Historic UN Human Rights Resolution covers Transgender People, TRANS-
GENDER EUR. (June 17, 2011), http://tgeu.org/historic-un-human-rights-resolution-covers
-transgender-people [http://perma.cc/8FYG-W87Q]; Kyle Knight & Neela Ghoshal, Rec-
ognizing the Rights of Transgender People, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 13, 2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/13/recognizing-rights-transgender-people [https://
perma.cc/ZKQ8-6X42]; Twelve UN agencies issue unprecedented joint statement on rights
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender & intersex people, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Dis
playNews.aspx?NewsID=%2016511&LangID=E [http://perma.cc/A5P3-4HMR].
272. See Truffer, supra note 1, at 111.

